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Abstract 
In this paper we examine what characterizes family firms’ decisions when it comes to 
having a family member being the CEO or the chairman of the board of the company. 
We define this as family management, which is the dependent variable in our research. 
This variable has four non-ordered mutually exclusive values; family CEO, family 
chairman of the board, family CEO and family chairman of the board, and neither family 
CEO nor family chairman of the board. Using data from the Center for Corporate 
Governance Research (CCGR) we have analyzed approximately 79,000 Norwegian 
private family firms. Based on a thorough literature review we chose performance, firm 
size, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, and industry 
risk as our independent variables in the base case model. We find that some 
determinants of family management are the same for all categories of family 
management, while other determinants make the choice differ. The choice of having a 
family CEO is more likely in large firms, with high family ownership stake and low 
industry risk, whereas the choice of having a chair is more likely in small firms with low 
family ownership stake. The choice of having family members in both positions is more 
likely in small firms with a high family ownership stake and low industry risk. This shows 
that the combination of characteristics determines what type of family management 
family firms choose. We also find that family management overall is more likely in young 
family firms with high performance and a high fraction of family members on the board. 
This shows how the choices are related as well as how they differ. Conversely, family 
firms are more likely to replace a family member in the management subsequent to low 
performance, if the firm is older, or if there is a low fraction of family members on the 
board. An analysis of the findings indicates that families both hold and use control in 
order to secure the management positions, especially when the fraction of family 
members on the board is high. Nevertheless, it seems that families, opposed to earlier, 
now need and want a higher ownership stake before taking this control, which 
illustrates a seemingly positive trend. These two opposing forces are the most 
interesting finding throughout the paper, and demonstrate what can be changing 
governance mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
Family firms are an interesting field of research within corporate governance due to 
their distinction from other firms. Defining family firms as firms where a blood-and-
marriage family owns more than 50% of the equity, approximately 68% of all active 
Norwegian firms are family firms. This makes them a significant part of the Norwegian 
economy (Bøhren 2011). These family firms are almost always private, but in contrast to 
how common they are, private firms are an underexplored area of study (Berzins, 
Bøhren and Rydland 2008). If studied, most research is either based on public family 
firms or weak family firm definitions. The research has mainly focused on the 
relationship between family ownership and performance, while few papers concern the 
actual behavior of family firms. Through this paper we want to investigate this behavior 
and determine what characterizes the choice of family management in family firms. 
Henceforth, we define family management as a situation where a family firm has a 
family CEO or a family chairman of the board of directors, or hold both positions at the 
same point in time. 
2. Theory and motivation 
2.1 Existing research 
In the area of corporate governance and family firms, agency theory is essential for 
understanding concepts of ownership and management. The first agency problem (A1) 
deals with conflicts between owners and managers (Villalonga and Amit 2006). It is 
assumed to be less prevalent in family firms as the separation between owners and 
managers, i.e. ownership and control, is less widespread. This suggests that the costs of 
A1 are low, thus performance of family firms should be enhanced (Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou 2009). The second agency problem (A2) deals with conflicts between large 
and small shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2006), where we consider the family as the 
majority shareholder. The family might have incentives to extract private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders, which in consequence can reduce firm value from the 
minority’s point of view. The significance of the second agency problem is ambiguous. In 
a situation where the family owns just above 50%, the possible conflicts are more 
serious than if the family has a 100% ownership stake. Thus, if the family ownership 
stake is very high, the problem is limited seeing that the family carries most of the cost 
of A2 themselves (Bøhren 2011). Nevertheless, the family’s exploitation of the minority 
owners might have a serious effect on the firm’s performance (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 
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2009), which indicates that the second agency problem is certainly present. Therefore, 
the second agency problem will be a prime focus throughout this study. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) explore the relationship between founding-family ownership 
of S&P500 firms, and performance, measured by either return on assets (ROA) or 
Tobin’s q. They found that family firms outperform non-family firms, which together 
with other studies (e.g. Villalonga and Amit 2006, Maury 2006) support a positive 
relationship between performance and family ownership. This suggests that conflicts 
between owners and managers (A1) and conflicts between small and large owners (A2) 
are less serious in family firms relative to non-family firms. These results concern family 
firms overall, and do not consider the management structure within the firms.  
Taking management into account, the first agency problem should be insignificant in 
family firms with family management due to no separation between ownership and 
management. This will especially be the case in a situation where a family member is the 
CEO, as this position holds more of the actual decision-making authority within the firm.  
However, with family management the family is assumed to obtain more information 
about the firm and consequently achieve more control (Bøhren 2011). Thus, family 
management might aggravate the second agency problem because extraction of private 
benefits are more likely when the CEO or/and the chairman of the board are insiders.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that family firms with a family CEO outperform family 
firms with outside management. In a study of Fortune 500 firms, Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) also found a positive relationship between performance and family management, 
but only when the family CEO was the founder of the firm or when a non-family CEO 
existed in the presence of the founder as the chairman of the board. This indicates that 
the founders are one of the main reasons for the success of family firms due to their 
passion and involvement in the firm’s operations. Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) support 
this by finding that family successions in Italian family firms have a negative impact on 
performance. Hillier and McColgan (2009) investigated UK listed companies and found 
that the performance of family firms, measured by return on assets, improves after 
announcement of a departing family CEO. This effect is ascribed to the fact that family 
CEOs are not forced to leave their position subsequent to weak firm performance, 
relative to non-family CEOs. Finally, Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schøne (2005) show that 
family firms with an outside CEO have the same productivity as non-family firms, 
whereas family firms with an inside CEO are less productive. This supports that the 
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conflict between large and small shareholders are aggravated with an inside CEO due to 
their control of the firm. However, it might also indicate that inside managers are poor 
performing managers in general. Therefore, the results could occur due to the 
management’s effectiveness, not the allocation of managerial positions. 
Bennedsen et al. (2006) investigated Danish family firms and the relationship between 
family succession decisions and performance, measured by operating return on assets. 
They found an immense negative impact on firm performance, particularly in large firms 
and firms that operate in fast-growing and complex industries. This suggests that 
different characteristics affect the outcome of changes in the management of family 
firms. Thus, the interesting question is; what drives the appointment of family 
management?  
2.2 Motivation 
Using unique data consisting of all public and private firms in Norway, we are able to 
investigate family firms with family management in a more comprehensive way than 
research based on listed family firms. Previous research has foremost focused on the 
performance of family firms, while few have concerned the behavior of family firms. 
From our literature review we observe that studies of family firm performance are 
altered when taking family management and other characteristics into account. 
However, few studies have been centered on these characteristics as the explanation for 
the behavior of family firms. We will distinguish between different types of family 
involvement, by categorizing family management based on the definition previously 
elaborated. 
The explanatory variables we find relevant to include in our study are: firm 
performance, firm size, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of inside board 
members, and industry risk. These variables have already been applied in previous 
research, but falls within three different categories: control variables, independent 
variables in research concerning family succession, or independent variables in research 
concerning family firm performance. None of the variables have had the leading role in 
the understanding of family firm behavior. Therefore, in this study we intend to turn the 
equation and see what characteristics determine the choice of family management in 
family firms. This is a rarely observed approach, and combined with our unique data we 
believe that our thesis will contribute to a more comprehensive and integrated 
perspective on the behavior of family firms with family management.  
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3. Research question  
3.1 Main research question 
We want to examine what characterizes the decision of having a family member being 
the CEO or the chairman of the board of a family firm. This includes both what 
determines the choices separately, but also if there is a relationship between the two 
choices. Accordingly, our main research question is: 
What characterizes family firms with family management? 
3.2 Sub-questions 
Based on our research question, we propose the following sub-questions: 
 What characterizes a family firm with a family CEO? 
 What characterizes a family firm with a family chairman of the board? 
 What is the relationship between these choices? 
4. Data 
4.1 Database 
We utilize data from Norwegian private and public firms in the period from 2000 – 2009, 
supplementing with accounting figures dated back to 1997. We employ data from the 
Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI Norwegian Business School.  
4.2 Data filters 
The population consists of over 357,000 companies. To ensure consistency in the 
research of family firms we will apply relevant filters, including filters from Berzins, 
Bøhren and Rydland (2008):  
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 Filter 1: Remove all companies without limited liability 
 Filter 2: Positive sales 
 Filter 3: Positive assets 
 Filter 4: Companies must have employees in the sample period  
 Filter 5: Current assets must exceed cash equivalents 
 Filter 6: Assets must exceed working capital  
 Filter 7: Remove financial firms  
 Filter 8: Remove subsidiaries1 
 Filter 9: Remove listed firms 
 Filter 10: Companies must have four years or more of data 
Filter 1-4 ensures that the firms in the sample have limited liability and are active 
(Svalland and Vangstein 2009). Filter 5 and 6 put consistency restrictions on the 
relationship between a sum and its components (Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland 2008). 
Filter 7 and 8 are also applied by Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland (2008), where the latter 
makes us focus on parent companies and their consolidated numbers. Filter 9 is applied 
as only a fraction of the firms are listed and these hold different characteristics than 
non-listed firms (Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland 2008). Lastly, to secure a consistency in 
the sample, as well as secure a certain level of activity, we apply a lower cut-off of four 
years of accounting data. In the base case model we end up with a sample of 78,783 
unique companies. 
4.3 Variables 
Family firm 
Family firms are defined as firms where a blood-and-marriage family owns more than 
50% of the firm’s equity. In other words, the cut-off point of family firms is determined 
whether or not the family has a simple majority in the firm.  
Family management 
We define family management as a situation where a family member, by blood or 
marriage, is the CEO and/or the chairman of the board of the family firm.   
                                                          
1
 Where the parent company is a holding company, defined as parent company with non-existing 
sales, the largest subsidiary is included in the sample. 
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Performance 
We measure performance by return on assets (ROA). According to Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus (2009) ROA measures the profitability for all contributors of capital. It is defined 
as: 
    
     
                    
 
                
                    
 
The tax rate is 28%2. We use average performance of 3 years in our model, i.e. the 
average of the current year and the two past years. The choice of performance variable 
is firstly due to a possible endogeneity problem which will be discussed later. Secondly, 
average performance will diminish the effect of extraordinary economic events. The 
average performance the last t years is defined as: 
                                 
     
 
   
 
 
ROA measures how well the management uses the firm’s assets to create profit through 
the operations of the firm (Robinson et al. 2009). As mentioned before, existing research 
supports both a negative and a positive relationship between performance and family 
firms, although the support is stronger for a positive relationship. Whether the 
performance is related to agency problems or the actual performance of the 
management is a problem addressed in the literature review.  According to Bøhren 
(2011), family management creates fewer conflicts between owners and managers. 
However, by choosing a family CEO the firm might ignore the best candidate for the job. 
One can expect that if a firm has good performance they can afford to hire a non-family 
CEO. Nevertheless, the performance might be satisfactory such that owners do not see 
the need of hiring a non-family CEO. Consequently, there are two competing predictions 
for the relationship between family management and performance. 
Size  
We measure firm size by the natural logarithm of sales. We have chosen this measure to 
make size independent of the firm’s technology and capital structure. The size may 
affect the stability of the firm, which again could affect the choice of management. 
According to Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) study of S&P500 family firms, these are 
smaller than other firms. This is supported by a recent study of Norwegian firms that 
                                                          
2
 The corporate tax rate in Norway is flat at 28% (Ministry of Finance 2011). 
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family firms are smaller than non-family firms (Bøhren 2011). Focusing on family 
management in family firms, existing research indicates that family management is 
more common in smaller firms. Bennedsen et al. (2006) found that family firms with a 
family successor are smaller than firms that select a non-family CEO. Smith and Amoako-
Adu’s (1999) paper discovered that family successions are more challenging and value-
reducing in smaller firms because the CEO of smaller firms has more control than in 
larger firms. Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) support the argument of Smith and Amoako-
Adu (1999), when finding that replacing the founder of a small- or medium-size 
company is more challenging because of the founder’s close personal ties with the 
stakeholders of the firm. Thus, the two latter arguments deal with the relationship 
between firm size and family management from an agency point of view. Based on these 
arguments, we expect that family management is more prevalent in smaller firms. 
Notwithstanding, we expect that the type of family management differ in larger family 
firms. It is likely that the need for a professional, outside CEO is greater in large firms, 
but that the family retains some control by holding the position as the chairman of the 
board. This again makes it less likely that the family holds both positions simultaneously. 
The appointment of CEO is therefore based on a skill argument, while the appointment 
of chair is based on an agency argument. Thus, we expect a negative relation between 
family CEO and firm size, and a likewise positive relationship between family chair and 
firm size.  
Firm age 
We measure firm age by the exact number of years the company has been operating. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) analyze firm age, and find that family firms are younger than 
non-family firms. Bennedsen et al. (2006) find that performance is not affected by firm 
age around successions. We expect that when family firms are new, a family founder is a 
part of the management. However, it is also likely that old family firms choose family 
management due to their traditional views and close relationships with employees and 
board members. Nevertheless, we expect there to be a negative relationship between 
firm age and family CEO, as founders of newly established family firms are more likely to 
choose the role of CEO over the position as chairman. This is substantiated by the fact 
that 35 % of family firms are single-owner firms (Bøhren 2011), and that the founder in 
many cases has to choose between the two management positions (Lov om 
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aksjeselskaper 1997)3. However, we also expect a negative relationship between firm 
age and family chairman as the family founder will choose an owning or a non-owning 
family member as the chairman. 
Family ownership stake in the firm 
We measure the family ownership stake by the fraction of family owners over the 
numbers of owners. According to Bøhren (2011) there are many family firms with super-
majority or even no other owners than the family. From agency theory we know that in 
a firm where the majority owner has an ownership stake just above 50%, possible 
conflicts between large and small owners (A2) are more serious compared to a firm 
where the majority owner has close to 100% ownership stake. The reason is that 
majority owners’ incentives to extract private benefits are larger when they own just 
above 50%. We believe that as the ownership stake of the family decreases it will be 
more challenging to implement family management. This is because minority 
shareholders want to prevent the majority owner, the family, of getting extended 
control. Another hypothesis is that a non-family CEO can be chosen even with a large 
family ownership stake, because the family can obtain control through the board of 
directors. This resembles the outcome- and substitution model normally applied to the 
choice of a firm’s dividend policy (Bøhren 2011)4. The family might also have incentives 
to hire a family CEO when the family ownership stake is decreasing in order to remain in 
control. We assume that the outcome model is the most relevant in this situation, 
meaning that the family has the power and chooses to use it. Accordingly, we expect to 
see a positive relationship between family management and family ownership stake. 
Fraction of inside board members 
We measure the fraction of inside board members by the number of inside board 
members over the total number of board members. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) 
found that the average number of family board members is higher when appointing a 
family member as the CEO. We therefore expect that as the fraction of insiders of the 
board increase, the choice of family management is more common than in the case of 
                                                          
3
 In firms with equity of NOKM 3 or higher, one person can either be the CEO or the chairman of 
the board, but can only hold one position at a time.  
4
 The choice of dividend policy is applied to the choice of family management. The model 
illustrates that the majority does not necessarily use their control to exploit the minority.  
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boards with a large fraction of independent directors. We assume this will apply for all 
categories of family management.  
Industry risk 
Like Svalland and Vangstein (2009) we measure industry risk by using the coefficient of 
variation of earnings as a proxy. This is defined as the ratio of standard deviation to the 
mean of operating income5, and is useful in determining the assumed volatility 
compared to the expected operating income (Black 2010). The industry risk is computed 
as the average industry risk within each industry code for the whole time period 
between 2000 and 2009. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the distribution of family 
firms across industries is not uniformly distributed. According to Bøhren (2011) owning 
managers with a high ownership stake are often undiversified because they receive their 
income and most of their fortune from the same source, namely the firm. From this we 
assume that family managers will be more risk averse than independent managers. 
Owners are likely more concerned in high-risk industries where there is more 
uncertainty related to firm performance. Hence, the demand for a “professional” non-
family CEO is higher. We expect that family management is less prevalent in firms 
exposed to high industry risk, and we expect that the relationship to be stronger when it 
comes to the family holding the position as the CEO. 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Regression model 
To model what determines the choice of family management, family management is 
chosen as the dependent variable. We let the dependent variable have four non-
ordered, mutually exclusive values: 
 Y1: Family CEO 
 Y2: Family chairman of the board 
 Y3: Family CEO and family chairman of the board 
 Y4: Neither family CEO nor family chairman of the board 
The variables described in chapter 4.3 will be the independent variables of the model to 
observe how these affect the choice of family management.  
                                                          
5
 Like Svalland and Vangstein (2009), we use the absolute value of the mean as the denominator. 
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When the dependent variable has multiple outcomes that cannot be ordered, we apply 
a multinomial logistic model. According to Borooah (2002) this is a valid method when 
we examine choices that have no apparent negative or positive connotation. In a 
multinomial logistic specification, the dependent variable represents discrete choices, 
which corresponds to the four non-ordered values above.  
We propose the following multinomial logistic model:  
 
   
   
  






 
riskindustry
membersboardfamilyfractionstakownershipfamily
agefirmsizefirmeperformanc
variabletindependen
6
54
3231 )(
e
Y
Y
i
iii
 
In the model, α is a constant and ε is the error term. 
As we have many companies with observations over time, the data is considered as 
panel or longitudinal data. Seeing that a multinomial logistic model is not compatible 
with panel data, we run year-by-year regressions to deal with this issue. Table 1 gives a 
more stylistic view of the model, as well as specifies the expected sign of the 
independent variables based on the discussion above: 
Table 1: Regression model with predictions 
Theoretical variable Proxy CCGR data item 
Predicted sign 
CEO / chair 
Family management Largest family has CEO 
Largest family has chair 
15304 
15305 
Dependent 
variables 
Performance Return on assets 15019, 15063, 
15078 
+or-/+or- 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 15009 -/+ 
Firm age Company age 13420 -/- 
Ownership stake Largest family sum ultimate 
ownership 
15302 +/+ 
Fraction of inside 
board members 
Fraction of inside board 
members 
15308, 602 +/+ 
Industry risk  Arithmetic average of 
diversification proxy for each 
industry code 
11103 -/- 
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5.2 Endogeneity problem 
The study has a potential endogeneity problem. There is a possibility that not only firm 
performance affects the choice of CEO, but that family management also affects 
performance. This endogeneity problem might apply to other variables as well, such as 
the relationship between firm size and family management. The problem also involves 
the issue of multicollinearity, as related governance mechanisms might generate 
insignificant results (Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland 2008). 
Several measures have been taken to account for this. Firstly, letting performance be an 
independent variable in a logistic regression deals with the causality issue. Secondly, 
using average performance the past three years will also mitigate the problem. The 
problem of multicollinearity will be dealt with in the robustness testing.  
6. Main results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Hereafter, the four choices of family management are referred to as family CEO, family 
chair, both or neither. Table 2 shows pooled descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
main sample. All variables are based on nominal levels, unless otherwise stated.  
Family management is the dependent variable consisting of the above mentioned four 
mutually exclusive values. Seeing that the median is 3 the majority of the family firms 
choose to have both family CEO and family chair. This indicates that families prefer to 
keep all control of the company within the family. We observe a mean return on assets 
(ROA) of 8.65%. There are extreme positive and negative values of performance, but 
most of the firms’ performance is distributed close to the mean. 
 
Family 
management ROA Firm size Firm age
Family 
ownership 
stake
Fraction of 
family board 
members Industry risk
Mean 2,7511 0,0865 14,8070 11,7208 0,9166 0,8542 1,6379
Median 3,0000 0,0750 14,8997 9,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,6269
Std.dev. of mean 0,0009 0,0002 0,0024 0,0157 0,0002 0,0004 0,0004
Skewness -1,4716 -0,1392 -0,7019 2,8594 -0,0149 -1,6150 1,8041
Kurtosis 2,0562 2,2542 1,3933 14,9581 0,0062 1,4680 7,0903
Minimum 1,0000 -0,4372 6,9078 0,0000 0,5010 0,0000 -0,3871
Maximum 4,0000 0,5080 18,4205 167,0000 1,0000 1,0000 3,3617
Table 2: Descriptive statistics main sample
The table shows pooled descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Family management is the dependent
variable, consisting of four mutually exclusive values. ROA is NOPAT over average total assets. Firm size is the
natural logarithm of assets. Firm age is the number of years the company has been operating. Industry risk is the
natural logaritm of coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation of operating income over mean
operating income. In addition to the fi lters in chapter 4, ROA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Measuring firm size by the natural logarithm of sales, we find a mean and median of 
approximately 14.8, which indicates yearly sales of approximately NOKM 2.7. 
Furthermore, the sample consists of firms with an average age of 11.7 years and median 
of 9 years. Observing a maximum value of 167 years we see that extreme values are 
included in the sample, which is supported by a very high kurtosis. The large, positive 
skewness substantiates that most firms are young.  
Seeing that the data only includes family firms, the minimum value of family ownership 
stake is 50.1%. Even so, the mean is 91.66% and the median is 100%, indicating high 
ownership concentration. Negative skewness suggests that most family firms have a 
large family ownership stake. On average, 85.42% of the board consists of family 
members, and the median is 100%. A negatively skewed distribution demonstrates that 
family firms have a high fraction of family members on the board. Finally, the mean 
industry risk is 1.64. The positive skewness indicates that more family firms have lower 
industry risk, while the high kurtosis is due to the extreme maximum value of industry 
risk.   
From table 3, we see that performance, firm size, and industry risk has been relatively 
stable during the sample period from 2000 to 2009. Firm age has increased during the 
overall period, indicating that the sample firms have overall survived. However, looking 
at the three last years of the period we observe that the number of sample firms has 
decreased. This might demonstrate either the increased number of bankruptcies during 
the financial crisis around 2008 or that newly established firms do not have enough 
accounting data to be included in the sample. Nevertheless, both family ownership stake 
and fraction of family board members during the sample period have increased, which 
might be due to family firms including new and younger members of the family.  
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N 43 970 46 550 46 726 48 548 48 816 46 621 45 432 49 019 46 625 44 582
Family management 2,7568 2,7498 2,7524 2,7333 2,7583 2,7529 2,7561 2,7504 2,7499 2,7515
0,6565 0,6645 0,6523 0,6430 0,6543 0,6232 0,6305 0,6230 0,6213 0,6199
ROA 0,0876 0,0831 0,0828 0,0790 0,0851 0,0839 0,0887 0,0950 0,0935 0,0853
0,1389 0,1405 0,1416 0,1447 0,1472 0,1483 0,1475 0,1411 0,1411 0,1362
Firm size 14,7443 14,7338 14,7505 14,7325 14,7886 14,7096 14,7807 14,9369 14,9694 14,9214
1,6106 1,6348 1,6464 1,6499 1,6321 1,6101 1,6464 1,6378 1,6621 1,6922
Firm age 10,1391 9,7871 10,7360 11,0155 11,6177 11,3314 12,2327 12,3392 13,3375 14,2563
10,5746 9,5455 9,5234 10,5186 10,5669 10,5127 10,5326 10,7762 10,8413 10,8117
Family ownership stake 90,3768 90,5931 90,5794 90,7379 91,0208 91,9195 91,9360 92,9919 93,1504 93,3400
15,8349 15,7049 15,7069 15,5766 15,3952 14,7893 14,7947 14,0111 13,8604 13,7004
Fraction of family board members 0,8384 0,8376 0,8433 0,8485 0,8442 0,8615 0,8600 0,8676 0,8701 0,8702
0,2773 0,2806 0,2719 0,2635 0,2741 0,2548 0,2607 0,2492 0,2467 0,2471
Industry risk 1,6504 1,6556 1,6545 1,6516 1,6522 1,6528 1,6510 1,6472 1,6473 1,5169
0,2868 0,2913 0,2904 0,2860 0,2861 0,2896 0,2863 0,2843 0,2850 0,3570
The table shows yearly mean and standard deviation of the independent variables, as well as the number of observations. Please refer 
to table 1 for the definitions of variables.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics per year
N ROA Firm size Firm age
Family 
ownership 
stake
Fraction of 
family board 
members Industry risk
Family only has CEO 35 455 0,0727 15,3957 11,8581 81,2834 0,4162 0,0025
(7,59 %) 0,1375 1,5897 10,2665 22,4475 0,1989 0,2507
Family only has Chair 61 565 0,0807 14,7979 11,4789 89,1391 0,8421 0,0220
(13,19 %) 0,1512 1,6977 9,7618 23,9299 0,2831 0,2710
Family has both 353 626 0,0905 14,7321 11,7429 93,6744 0,9270 0,0299
(75,74 %) 0,1416 1,6000 10,5255 16,5736 0,1944 0,2475
Family has neither 16 243 0,0534 15,1873 11,8680 80,1175 0,2300 -0,0161
(3,48 %) 0,1538 1,6763 10,3743 20,8477 0,2211 0,2753
The table shows pooled mean and standard deviation for the independent variables per management category, as 
well as the number (percentage) of observations within each category. Please refer to table 2 for definitions of the 
variables.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics per family management category
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From table 4 we see that the majority of the firms (75.74%) included in the sample have 
both family CEO and family chair. Based on this we might infer that family firms view 
family CEO and family chair as complements rather than substitutes. By looking at family 
management as a whole we find that 96.52% of the firms have family management.  
This demonstrates that most Norwegian family firms choose family members to manage 
the firm, and support the assumption that the outcome model can be applied. 
Family firms have the highest performance (9.05%) when they have both family CEO and 
family chair. Firms with outside CEO and chair have the lowest performance (5.34%). 
Family ownership stake is largest among firms with both family CEO and family chair.  
Interestingly, there is very little difference between the family ownership stake for firms 
with family CEO and that of firms without family management. When the fraction of 
family board members is high, family firms are likely to have family chair or both. The 
fraction is much lower for firms with only family CEO, and lowest for firms with no family 
management. A possible explanation is that boards are relatively small and that the 
fraction increases considerably with a family chair. Firms with family chair or both family 
CEO and chair have considerably higher industry risk than firms with family CEO or no 
family management. This shows that in high-risk industries the family retains control 
through the position as the chairman, while the position as the CEO differs. 
Lastly, firm size and company age are similar for firms with and without family 
management, indicating little relation to the firms’ choice of family management. 
Looking at the table as a whole it seems like the characteristics of family firms with 
family chair and both family chair and CEO are similar. 
In conclusion, from the descriptive statistics we see that most family firms are family 
managed, with the majority having both family CEO and family chair. Family ownership 
fraction and fraction of family board members are high, where the highest is within 
firms with both family CEO and chair. The performance of family firms with family 
management are close to the mean for the whole sample, while family firms without 
family management have considerable lower ROA. Family firms with family chair, or 
both family CEO and chair, operate within more risky industries. Family firms are mostly 
young and small, independent of the management, and all variables seem fairly stable 
over time. 
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6.2 Regressions 
The results from the base case regression are reported in table 5. The reference 
category is defined as ‘Family has neither CEO nor chair’, meaning that each coefficient 
is relative to this choice. Coefficient values above zero indicate that a one-unit increase 
of the variable in question will lead to a greater likelihood of choosing the family 
management type in question. The exact likelihood, the odds ratio, is given by the 
exponential of each coefficient (Costea 2005).   
Firm performance measured by ROA has a significant, positive effect on the choice of 
hiring family CEO, family chair or both. The strongest effect is with respect to having 
both, with a coefficient of 1.877 in 2009 corresponding to an odds ratio of 6.5. 
Interestingly, ROA did not have a significant effect on the choice of family CEO until 
2006, indicating that firm performance has not been a determinant of family CEO until 
the recent years. A positive relationship between performance and family management, 
and a likewise negative relationship between performance and non-family management, 
indicates that during bad times, family management are more likely to be replaced with 
non-family management, either voluntarily or forced. On the one hand this might show 
that family firms reciprocate against management with poor performance, independent 
of family relations. On the other hand, it might be the case that poor performing family 
management want to leave its position as it is in the best interest of the firm. The 
management will more likely be willing to leave managerial positions voluntarily when a 
large portion of the manager’s wealth is invested in the family firm. 
The effect of firm size on family management varies between the different types of 
family management. The tendency is that firm size has a positive effect on the choice of 
family CEO, but a negative effect on the choice of family chair or both. This further 
substantiates indications that the choice of family chair and both are similar. The 
relationship between firm size and family CEO was not significant in the last three yearly 
regressions, indicating that firm size is no longer an important determinant of family 
CEO. Nevertheless, the regressions show that larger firms are more likely to choose a 
family CEO, while smaller firms prefer family chair or both. This is opposite of our initial 
predictions, and shows that there is possibly an agency argument for the choice of CEO 
and a skill argument for the choice of chair. Thus, the results indicate that families likely 
regard being CEO of a large company as prestigious, and being CEO of a small company 
as an easier task. It might also be the case that it is more important for a   
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -1,874*** -1,261 -0,966* -0,882* -1,157** 0,016 -0,981* 0,792 0,530 0,518
0,407 0,404 0,416 0,395 0,386 0,441 0,421 0,452 0,454 0,445
ROA 0,398 0,187 0,454 -0,001 0,334 -0,118 0,488* 1,042*** 1,042*** 0,982***
0,240 0,237 0,244 0,226 0,219 0,246 0,229 0,252 0,249 0,269
Firm size 0,123*** 0,088*** 0,076*** 0,063** 0,081*** 0,025 0,083*** -0,010 -0,005 -0,010
0,021 0,021 0,022 0,021 0,020 0,023 0,022 0,024 0,023 0,024
Firm age -0,008* -0,007* -0,011** -0,014*** -0,010*** -0,012*** -0,012*** -0,006 -0,008** -0,007*
0,003 0,003 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,507** -0,375* -0,588** 0,200 -0,415* -0,015 -0,428* 0,387* 0,380* 0,354
0,177 0,183 0,189 0,180 0,172 0,195 0,183 0,194 0,194 0,198
Fraction of family board members 3,780*** 3,984*** 4,157*** 3,123*** 4,297*** 2,992*** 3,779*** 2,294*** 2,392*** 2,579***
0,152 0,159 0,169 0,158 0,156 0,169 0,159 0,168 0,169 0,173
Industry risk -0,133 -0,212* -0,211 -0,193 -0,190 -0,206 -0,252* -0,360*** -0,255* -0,249**
0,107 0,108 0,110 0,106 0,102 0,112 0,108 0,109 0,110 0,094
Intercept -1,993*** -1,787*** -1,394** -0,974* -1,349*** -0,194 -0,321 0,553 0,628 0,722
0,434 0,441 0,445 0,416 0,421 0,465 0,441 0,476 0,477 0,468
ROA 1,099*** 1,048*** 0,996*** 0,214 0,808*** 0,052 0,799*** 1,501*** 1,268*** 1,331***
0,255 0,258 0,261 0,239 0,242 0,259 0,245 0,270 0,266 0,287
Firm size -0,029 -0,049* -0,067** -0,091*** -0,073*** -0,137*** -0,141*** -0,157*** -0,152*** -0,143***
0,023 0,023 0,024 0,022 0,022 0,024 0,023 0,025 0,025 0,025
Firm age -0,013*** -0,014*** -0,018*** -0,016*** -0,012*** -0,013*** -0,011*** -0,006 -0,010** -0,012***
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -1,166*** -1,254*** -1,447*** -0,809*** -1,543*** -0,991*** -1,355*** -1,146*** -1,367*** -1,318***
0,198 0,207 0,210 0,196 0,197 0,214 0,203 0,213 0,214 0,219
Fraction of family board members 9,038*** 9,586*** 9,648*** 8,831*** 9,812*** 8,723*** 9,478*** 8,199*** 8,345*** 8,461***
0,177 0,188 0,196 0,179 0,184 0,192 0,185 0,189 0,190 0,195
Industry risk 0,044 0,061 0,115 0,039 0,115 0,107 0,082 -0,053 -0,018 -0,186
0,113 0,116 0,117 0,111 0,111 0,117 0,113 0,114 0,115 0,100
Intercept -1,370*** -1,203** -0,996* -0,987* -1,045** -0,184 -1,060* 0,223 -0,197 -0,470
0,414 0,423 0,428 0,402 0,403 0,449 0,428 0,459 0,461 0,453
ROA 1,313*** 1,290*** 1,239*** 0,725** 1,250*** 0,677** 1,403*** 1,868*** 1,764*** 1,877***
0,244 0,249 0,252 0,232 0,232 0,251 0,237 0,260 0,257 0,278
Firm size -0,051* -0,074*** -0,093*** -0,098*** -0,104*** -0,142*** -0,097*** -0,164*** -0,145*** -0,127***
0,022 0,022 0,023 0,021 0,021 0,024 0,022 0,024 0,024 0,025
Firm age -0,002 -0,004 -0,008* -0,008** -0,008** -0,011*** -0,010** -0,008* -0,011*** -0,012***
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,697*** -0,792*** -0,800*** -0,069 -0,658*** -0,023 -0,416* 0,448* 0,440* 0,358
0,185 0,196 0,199 0,186 0,186 0,202 0,192 0,201 0,202 0,206
Fraction of family board members 10,628*** 11,223*** 11,272*** 10,333*** 11,530*** 10,212*** 10,909*** 9,661*** 9,801*** 9,967***
0,173 0,184 0,192 0,175 0,179 0,187 0,181 0,183 0,184 0,189
Industry risk -0,297** -0,262* -0,178 -0,217* -0,170 -0,201 -0,214 -0,353*** -0,291** -0,293**
0,109 0,113 0,113 0,107 0,107 0,113 0,109 0,110 0,112 0,096
N 36 743 36 008 36 166 41 996 42 342 40 220 41 337 44 055 45 431 43 339
Cox and Snell 0,342 0,356 0,335 0,307 0,351 0,292 0,320 0,293 0,290 0,290
Nagelkerke 0,423 0,440 0,418 0,382 0,440 0,374 0,401 0,380 0,378 0,377
McFadden 0,253 0,265 0,252 0,225 0,270 0,227 0,241 0,236 0,234 0,233
Family has both
Pseudo R-Square
Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression, base case model
Multinomial logistic regression with family management as the dependent variable. The independent variables are firm performance measured by three years of 
average return on assets, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, and industry 
risk measured by the coefficient of variation.  Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0*1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are stated in 
parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
GRA 1900 Master Thesis  September 1, 2011 
Page 17 of 38 
 
family to obtain control through the CEO position in order to avoid the first agency 
problem (A1). 
Firm age has the same effect on all three categories of family management, with odds 
ratios approximately around 0.9. Thus, there is a negative effect of firm age on family 
management, and as anticipated this indicates that younger family firms are more likely 
to be managed by family members. We believe that one of the main reasons is that 
founders are often present in younger firms and they are more likely to take an active 
role in the firm. 
Surprisingly, the choice of family CEO is mostly negatively related to family ownership 
stake with coefficients ranging between -0.588 and -0.375, corresponding to odds ratios 
between 0.555 and 0.687. However, the coefficients turn positive in 2007 (0.387), 
corresponding to an odds ratio of 1.473. The trend is repeated when it comes to the 
choice of having both. This indicates that in the early 2000s family firms with lower 
ownership stake was more likely to choose a family CEO or both, while this has turned 
opposite in recent years. For the choice of family chair, the coefficients are negative and 
significant for the whole time period, demonstrating that family firms with high 
ownership stake do not choose only family chair. This shows that in firms with high 
family ownership stake the family retains control through the position as the CEO, while 
the position as the chairman differs. On the one hand this indicates that the second 
agency problem (A2) in this particular situation is reduced seeing that the family does 
not exploit minority owners through taking control of the board. On the other hand the 
results might be due to the low number of owners in family firms, as approximately 35% 
of all family firms are single-owner firms (Bøhren 2011). In firms with equity of NOKM 3 
or higher, the single-owner can either be the CEO or the chairman of the board, but can 
only hold one position at a time (Lov om Aksjeselskaper 1997). The large negative 
coefficient for the choice of family chair indicates for these firms it is more likely that the 
owner holds the position as the CEO rather the than the chairman position. However, 
this logic will not hold for all companies seeing that 54% of all companies in the CCGR 
database have the same person being the CEO and chairman of the board Berzins, 
Bøhren and Rydland (2008)6. This means that a great fraction of the population’s family 
                                                          
6
 The database includes all companies in Norway, and the fraction of family firms having the same 
person being the CEO and the chairman of the board will therefore differ. 
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firms will fall within this category. Whether our reasoning will be compromised will be 
dealt with in the robustness testing. 
Furthermore, a high fraction of family members on the board has an immense positive 
effect on family management. The strongest effect is on the choice of family chair or 
both. The coefficient is the highest of all the independent variables, suggesting that it is 
one of the most important determinants of family management.  The high coefficients 
indicate that the family uses the board to take control, and that the second agency 
problem (A2) is somewhat serious in family firms.  
Observing industry risk, there is a negative relationship with the choice of family CEO 
and both. The coefficients are varying in the degree of significance, indicating that 
industry risk has been a more important determinant the last four years. A possible 
explanation is that when the risk of operating the firm is high the need for a 
“professional” CEO is higher as high performance is harder to achieve in complex 
industries. The choice of family chair seems not to be affected by industry risk, which 
contradicts the initial observations in the descriptive statistics.  
Table 6 summarizes the results discussed above as well as outlines our initial 
hypotheses. Plus and minus indicate positive and negative coefficients respectively, and 
no sign indicates insignificant coefficients. 
          Table 6: Variables with prediction and realized sign 
Theoretical variable 
Predicted sign 
CEO/Chair 
Realized sign 
CEO/Chair/Both 
Performance +or-/+or - +/+/+ 
Firm size -/+ +/-/- 
Firm age -/- -/-/- 
Ownership stake +/+ -+/-/-+ 
Fraction of inside board members +/+ +/+/+ 
Industry risk proxy -/- -/ /- 
 
Pseudo R-squares are reported in table 5, giving an indication of the goodness of fit of 
the model. Multinomial logistic regressions do not have an equivalent to the R-squared 
of the regular OLS-regression, meaning that the reported statistics should be interpreted 
with great caution. The little dispersion of the R-squares indicate that the model fits the 
data equally well during the sample period. A more illustrative measure of the goodness 
of fit is the likelihood ratio (Costea 2005) that evaluates the importance of each 
independent variable included in the regression. Table 7 displays the significance level 
for the likelihood ratio test for each independent variable. A significance level below 
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0.05 indicates that the variable in question contribute to the explanation of the choice 
of family management. The table demonstrates what has already been indicated; that 
all the variables contribute in explaining family firms’ choice of different types of family 
management.  
 
Table 8 summarizes what characterizes the decision of having family management. It 
displays what separates the choice of different types of family management from each 
other and what makes these choices related.  
Table 8: Current determinants of different types of family management 
Type of family management Determinants of family management 
Family only has CEO Large firm, high family ownership stake, low industry risk 
Family only has chair Small firm, low family ownership stake 
Family has both Small firm, high family ownership stake, low industry risk 
All categories of family 
management 
High performance, young firm, high fraction of family 
board members 
No family management 
(opposite of all categories) 
Low performance, old firm, low fraction of family board 
members 
 
6.3 Robustness testing  
6.3.1 Multicollinearity 
To ensure absence of multicollinearity, we examine the standard errors. Standard errors 
above the value two (2) indicate the presence of multicollinearity in the data (Costea 
2005). From table 5 we see that none of the standard errors are even close the 
threshold, meaning that multicollinearity is of minor concern in this study.  
6.3.2 Model specification 
Theory mostly concerns whether a family firm either has a family CEO or a family 
chairman. It does not combine them in order to make a third category of family 
management, where a family holds both positions at the same time. This makes our 
study somewhat different, and might cause results to contradict previous research. In 
addition, seeing that a substantial fraction of the firms in the population have the same 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,042 0,004 0,002
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002
Table 7: Significance level for likelihood ratio test
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes
significantly to explain the differences in the choice of family management.
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person being the CEO and the chairman, the above results might be further 
compromised. However, in order to look at the four choices interrelated we chose to 
operate with the four mutually exclusive values. To check whether or not the decision 
was appropriate we have performed additional logistic regressions with various 
dependent variables. These include: 
1. Family management: dummy variable with value of one (1) if the firm has either 
family CEO or family chairman, and zero (0) otherwise 
2. Family CEO: dummy variable with value of one (1) if the firm has family CEO, and 
zero (0) otherwise  
3. Family chairman: dummy variable with value of one (1) if the firm has family 
chairman, and zero (0) otherwise 
Observing the regression coefficients in table 10 as well as the significance level for each 
variable, we see that the values marginally change. The results from regression (1) 
resemble the base case category relating to a family having both family CEO and family 
chair. The results of regression (2) and (3) resemble the other two base case categories 
of family management. This indicates that the base case model is valid and that the 
results are indeed comparable with previous research. However, the Norwegian 
Company Legislation (Lov om aksjeselskaper 1997) might still affect our results in a way 
not captured by these additional regressions. 
6.3.3 Alternative empirical proxies 
To test the robustness of our model it is necessary to explore alternative empirical 
proxies for the variables employed. 
Family firm definition 
Additional regressions are performed where the family firm definition is based on super-
majority and negative majority, defined as family ownership stake above 66.7% and 
33.3%, respectively. The results are displayed in table 11-14 in the appendix. Unlike the 
base case model, we now find a positive relationship between family management and 
family ownership stake when the definition of a family firm is based on negative 
majority. However, when defining family firms based on super-majority the coefficients 
are either negative or insignificant. With higher family ownership stake there are likely 
fewer owners. This could be the explanation for a stronger, negative relationship 
between family management and family ownership stake in the case of super-majority. 
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Conversely, the coefficients turn positive with negative majority as the number of 
owners is likely to be higher with lower family ownership stake. 
Furthermore, when focusing on negative majority, industry risk seems to have a positive 
relationship with the choice of family chair. This differs from the choice of CEO and both 
in the base case model. In addition, industry risk does not have the same explanatory 
power when defining family firms based on super-majority. These results might reflect 
that industry risk is not an important determinant of family management, seeing that 
the significance of the variable differs. Accordingly, it seems that most relationships are 
maintained even after altering the definition of family firms. However, family ownership 
stake appears to have a varying effect on the choice of family management, hence it 
might be related to another variable, conceivably the number of owners.  
Performance 
To test the robustness of the definition of performance we run the base case regression 
with return on equity (ROE) as the proxy for the firm’s performance. This measure is less 
likely to correlate with ROA. ROE is defined as: 
    
     
              
 
                
              
 
The tax rate is 28%. As in the base case model we will use average performance of 3 
years, i.e. the average of the current year and the two past years. The average 
performance the last t years is defined as: 
                                 
     
 
   
 
 
From table 15 and 17 in the appendix, we see that the coefficients and the likelihood 
ratios are similar to the base case model, as are the Pseudo R-squares. However, we 
observe less significant coefficients for the relationship between firm performance, 
measured by ROE, and family management. This indicates that performance, measured 
by ROA, is a more important determinant of family management relative to 
performance measured by ROE. This is expected seeing that ROE is a more volatile 
measure than ROA. 
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Firm size 
To test the robustness of the definition of firm size we run the base case regression with 
the natural logarithm of assets as the proxy for the size of the firm. This is an approach 
observed in studies by Bennedsen et al. (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Table 16 
and 18 display the results of the regressions. For the choice of family chair and both, 
coefficients for firm size are persistently significant and negative as with the base case 
model. The relation between firm size and choice of CEO is positive in the beginning of 
the period, but turns negative in the later years. Even though we only observed 
significant positive coefficients in the base case model, the coefficients for 2007-2009 
were insignificant negative, indicating that the results observed in the robustness testing 
is consistent with the base case model. 
In conclusion, alternative empirical proxies have not altered the results of the base case 
model considerably, indicating that the base case model is robust. Nevertheless, we also 
control for alternative theoretical variables to further strengthen the robustness of our 
study. 
6.3.4 Alternative theoretical variables 
Additional characteristics of family firms with family management that we will control 
for are elaborated below. 
 Board size: When the board size increases it is likely harder to appoint family 
members as CEO or chair. This is due to the fact that it is harder to keep a large 
fraction of family members on the board (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999). 
Therefore we expect board size to correlate negatively with all categories of 
family management.  
 Location of the firm: The location might affect family management in terms of 
whether the firm is located in the central or in the more rural parts of Norway. 
We will measure this by defining whether or not the firm is located in a large 
city7. The location of a firm is an indicator of the job market, as a firm that 
operates in a large city has a job market with several professional candidates to 
                                                          
7
 Large city is defined as the five largest cities of Norway; Oslo, Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim 
and Stavanger (Statistics Norway 2011). In addition, the district of Akershus is added (The 
Government 2003). 
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choose from, while in smaller cities it might be difficult to find a professional 
CEO. Hence, we expect that firms located in more rural parts of Norway are 
likely to choose both family CEO and family chairman. 
 Number of owners: We will use the number of owners to see whether more 
dispersed ownership affects the choice of family management. Based on the 
results from the base case model we expect to see a negative relation to family 
CEO and a positive relation to family chair. 
 Level of dividends: Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that the level of dividends 
in family firms is lower than in non-family firms. Based on this, we believe that 
the level of dividends is lower with all categories of family management. 
Predictions are given in table 9 in the appendix. From the results in table 19 and 20 in 
the appendix, we observe some differences between the base case model and the 
extended model. As for the initial variables, firm size is now negatively related to family 
CEO, and family ownership stake has a persistently positive relation to family CEO. This 
is consistent with the last yearly regressions and the robustness testing. As for the 
control variables, dividend level does not have an apparent effect on the choice of 
family management. Board size is positively related to family CEO, while negatively 
related to family chair and both. This is the same relationship observed with firm size in 
the base case model, and could therefore be caused by a connection between board size 
and firm size. Furthermore, it seems that firms located in larger cities are more likely to 
choose a family chair than firms in more rural parts. Firstly, this indicates that the job 
market only have an effect on the choice of chair. Secondly, the positive relationship 
between family chair and larger cities might reflect that family firms have an agency 
argument for having a family chairman, in terms of remain in control of the firm. 
Lastly, the number of owners seems to be positively related to the choice of family CEO 
and negatively related to the choice of family chair. This invalidates the reason why we 
observe a negative relationship between family chair and family ownership stake is due 
to the frequency of single-owner firms. This is further substantiated by running a 
regression in a data set excluding single-owner family firms. Table 21 and 22 in the 
appendix show that the regression coefficients only marginally change, leading to the 
conclusion that the patterns found is not driven by single-owner firms as earlier 
suggested. Thus, the most possible explanation is that families do not exercise control 
when appointing the chairman of the board; a family with high ownership stake uses its 
control only to obtain control over the CEO position or both positions at the same time.  
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In conclusion, we see that although we observe discrepancies throughout the 
robustness testing, the coefficients, significance levels of the likelihood ratios, and the R-
squares are analogous. This suggests that our results remain valid. Nevertheless, 
additional regressions indicate that board size, and to a certain degree firm location and 
the number of owners, might be important determinants of family management. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated what determines the choice of family management in 
Norwegian family firms. We find that some determinants of family management are the 
same for all categories of family management, while others make the choice of family 
management differ. The choice of family CEO is more likely in large firms, with high 
family ownership stake and low industry risk, whereas the choice of chair is more likely 
in small firms with low family ownership stake. The choice of having family members in 
both positions is more likely in small firms with high family ownership stake and low 
industry risk. This shows that the combination of characteristics determines what type 
of family management family firms choose. We also find that family management 
overall is more likely in young family firms with high performance and with a high 
fraction of family members on the board. This shows how the choices differ, but also 
how they are related. Conversely, family firms are more likely to replace a family 
member in the management subsequent to low performance, if the firm is older or if 
there is a low fraction of family members on the board.  
Large, positive coefficients associated with the fraction of family board members 
indicate that families use control to secure the two most important positions within the 
firms, and signify the presence of the second agency problem (A2). This is in contrast to 
the negative relation between family ownership stake and family chair in the base case 
model, which we hypothesize to be due to little existence of A2. Thus, we conclude that 
the second agency problem is not prevalent in family firms due to high family ownership 
stake, but is clearly present when there is a high fraction of family board members.  
The overall results indicate that the determinants have changed the last ten years. This 
might be due to the economic climate during the time period, characterized by the dot-
com bubble and the credit crunch. However, it might also be a result of a changing view 
on how to effectively run family businesses. An emerging negative relationship between 
industry risk and family management indicates that families alter the business to take 
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into account higher risk of operating. This is substantiated by an emerging positive 
relationship between family ownership stake, and the choice of family CEO and both. 
This can be attributed to families needing and wanting a higher family ownership stake 
before taking control over the management positions, relative to the early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, as elaborated above, it seems that a high fraction of family board 
members reduce the effect of this seemingly positive trend. These two opposing forces 
are the most interesting finding throughout the paper, and demonstrate what can be 
changing governance mechanisms. 
The base case model seems robust over time when employing alternative empirical 
proxies and alternative theoretical variables. However, when controlling for additional 
variables, we find that there are supplementing determinants of family management, 
with board size as the most evident.  
Our results are relevant in order to understand what drives the appointment of family 
management in family firms. Through this paper one should get a better understanding 
of how different types of family management are related and also how they differ. We 
show that there are specific reasons for why family firms choose differently, and that 
the choices are not random. Consequently, family management should affect firms’ 
profitability. Further research could therefore be focused on turning the equation to see 
how family management affects among others growth, performance and value creation. 
Additionally, to get an even more comprehensive understanding of the behavior of 
family firms, we suggest that further research should focus on case studies to confirm 
the hypotheses suggested based on the observations throughout this study. What will 
be an important area of interest is a study of how the Norwegian Company Legislation 
(Lov om aksjeselskaper 1997) affects the governance of family firms, seeing that family 
firms have different requirements whether they have equity above or below NOKM 3. 
8. Limitations 
One limitation of our study is that there might be relevant variables that are not 
included in our analyses. As studying characteristics of family firms with family 
management is very comprehensive, the possibility of overlooking variables is present. 
However, as we have included six independent variables in our base case, and an 
additional four in our robustness testing, we believe that the most important 
determinants of family management are included. 
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Secondly, by running yearly regressions we observe some year-to-year differences. The 
most critical inconsistency is the effect of family ownership stake on the choice of family 
management, seeing that ownership structure is one of the most important factors 
within corporate governance.  This makes it harder to generalize our findings because 
there might be other reasons, such as economic fluctuations or spurious relationships 
creating these differences. However, the discrepancies might also be caused by an 
altering view on how to effectively manage a family business. Thus, this is and should be 
a prime focus in the near future. 
Finally, the endogeniety problem of our study is a never-ending issue in corporate 
governance. Even after letting performance be the independent variable and using the 
average 3-year ROA, we cannot with absolute certainty know whether the problem is 
mitigated. Despite of these limitations, we can definitely say that the choice of family 
management within family firms is not random, and we believe to have identified the 
most considerable determinants. 
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Appendix  
Table 9: Variables overview 
Theoretical variable Proxy CCGR data item Expected sign 
CEO/Chair 
Base case    
Family management Largest family firm has CEO 
Largest family firm has chair 
15304 
15305 
Dependent 
variables 
Performance Return on assets 15019, 15063, 
15078 
+or-/+or- 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 15009 -/+ 
Firm age Company age 13420 -/- 
Ownership stake Largest family sum ultimate ownership 15302 +/+ 
Industry risk proxy Arithmetic average of diversification 
proxy for each industry code 
11103 -/- 
Fraction of inside board members Fraction of inside board members 15308, 602 +/+ 
Alternative independent variables    
Performance ROE 15019, 15087 +or-/+or- 
Size Natural logarithm of assets 15063, 15078 -/+ 
Control variables    
Board size Number of board members 602 -/- 
Location By municipality and county 503, 504 -/- 
Number of owners Number of owners 202 -/+ 
Level of dividends Level of dividends 15041 -/- 
Filter variables    
Family firm Family firm dummy 15302 Filter 
Limited liability Enterprise type 6 Filter 
Sales Operating income 15019 Filter 
Assets Sum fixed and current assets 15063, 15078 Filter 
Employees Number of employees 15113 Filter 
Current assets Total current assets 15078 Filter 
Cash equivalents Cash and cash equivalents 15076 Filter 
Working capital Current assets minus current liabilities 15078, 15109 Filter 
Exclude subsidiaries Is subsidiary 14504 Filter 
Financial firms Industry code 11103 Filter 
Listed firms OSE listing status 402 Filter 
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Family management Family has CEO Family has chair
Intercept 1,609*** -0,752*** -0,4507
0,4352 0,1710 0,2712
ROA 1,358*** 0,593*** 0,940***
0,2638 0,1035 0,1705
Firm size -0,103*** 0,018* -0,122***
0,0235 0,0085 0,0146
Firm age -0,010*** -0,0014 -0,006***
0,0030 0,0013 0,0020
Family ownership stake 0,490* 1,309*** -0,414**
0,1935 0,0989 0,1298
Fraction of family board members 6,408*** 1,441*** 7,464***
0,1423 0,0549 0,1004
Industry risk -0,296*** -0,127*** -0,0650
0,0920 0,0380 0,0594
N 43 339 43 339 43 339
Cox and Snell 0,088 0,037 0,266
Nagelkerke 0,432 0,065 0,568
Table 10: Binary logistic regression, robustness testing year 2009
Binary logistic regression with different dependent variable for year 2009. Family 
management is a dummy variable indicating either family CEO or family chairman of the 
board. Family has CEO indicates that the firm has a family CEO. Family has Chair 
indicates that the firm has a family chairman of the board.The independent variables 
are firm performance measured by three years of average return on assets, firm size 
measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of 
family board members, and industry risk measured by the coefficient of variation.  
Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0*1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -1,678* -1,312* -0,668 -0,980 -2,004*** -0,916 -0,697 1,544* 0,238 0,020
0,658 0,635 0,674 0,642 0,617 0,678 0,659 0,685 0,683 0,653
ROA 0,237 0,004 0,392 -0,132 0,331 -0,705* 0,284 1,085*** 0,874** 0,741*
0,328 0,309 0,330 0,311 0,288 0,324 0,298 0,321 0,315 0,334
Firm size 0,135*** 0,108*** 0,072* 0,049 0,095*** 0,037 0,080** -0,022 0,004 0,029
0,027 0,026 0,028 0,027 0,026 0,029 0,028 0,030 0,030 0,030
Firm age -0,003 -0,001 -0,006 -0,012*** -0,009*** -0,008 -0,007 -0,002 -0,008* -0,007
0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake -1,039* -0,585 -0,723 0,354 -0,005 0,572 -0,900* -0,170 0,176 0,042
0,422 0,413 0,429 0,404 0,386 0,418 0,405 0,415 0,409 0,418
Fraction of family board members 3,801*** 4,081*** 4,502*** 3,421*** 4,621*** 3,556*** 4,439*** 2,617*** 2,945*** 3,092***
0,185 0,194 0,215 0,202 0,196 0,215 0,205 0,207 0,211 0,216
Industry risk -0,078 -0,281 -0,347* -0,143 -0,090 -0,195 -0,260 -0,468** -0,127 -0,203
0,161 0,164 0,168 0,157 0,149 0,167 0,165 0,156 0,160 0,126
Intercept 0,316 -0,050 0,914 0,635 0,080 0,912 1,943** 3,200*** 2,664*** 1,899**
0,695 0,690 0,718 0,673 0,667 0,716 0,697 0,723 0,722 0,693
ROA 0,897** 0,752* 0,821* 0,006 0,689* -0,586 0,503 1,583*** 1,293*** 1,182***
0,342 0,338 0,355 0,331 0,320 0,342 0,321 0,345 0,339 0,359
Firm size -0,080** -0,074** -0,126*** -0,145*** -0,111*** -0,174*** -0,195*** -0,223*** -0,216*** -0,159***
0,029 0,028 0,030 0,029 0,028 0,031 0,029 0,031 0,031 0,031
Firm age -0,010* -0,011* -0,017*** -0,016*** -0,012** -0,014*** -0,012** -0,007 -0,014*** -0,015***
0,004 0,005 0,005 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake -2,727*** -2,533*** -2,715*** -1,722*** -2,404*** -1,607*** -3,000*** -2,927*** -2,844*** -2,645***
0,454 0,460 0,467 0,431 0,429 0,451 0,446 0,451 0,445 0,457
Fraction of family board members 9,249*** 9,969*** 10,278*** 9,444*** 10,389*** 9,643*** 10,511*** 8,923*** 9,309*** 9,348***
0,216 0,232 0,250 0,230 0,231 0,245 0,240 0,234 0,239 0,244
Industry risk -0,037 -0,115 -0,128 -0,038 -0,007 -0,040 -0,044 -0,179 0,009 -0,156
0,171 0,176 0,178 0,165 0,164 0,176 0,173 0,165 0,171 0,134
Intercept -0,301 -0,819 -0,247 -0,592 -0,912 -0,254 0,262 1,815** 0,857 -0,135
0,670 0,667 0,696 0,655 0,643 0,694 0,678 0,700 0,701 0,672
ROA 0,986** 0,903** 0,970** 0,444 1,022*** -0,024 1,105*** 1,936*** 1,823*** 1,782***
0,332 0,328 0,346 0,323 0,310 0,334 0,313 0,335 0,329 0,348
Firm size -0,077** -0,073** -0,132*** -0,127*** -0,115*** -0,160*** -0,134*** -0,212*** -0,193*** -0,128***
0,028 0,027 0,029 0,028 0,027 0,030 0,029 0,031 0,030 0,031
Firm age 0,002 -0,001 -0,006 -0,008* -0,008* -0,011** -0,009* -0,009* -0,016*** -0,016***
0,004 0,005 0,005 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake -1,546*** -1,287** -1,056* -0,318 -0,866* -0,030 -1,642*** -0,609 -0,400 -0,495
0,433 0,439 0,449 0,414 0,408 0,430 0,425 0,430 0,424 0,435
Fraction of family board members 10,915*** 11,662*** 11,935*** 10,967*** 12,181*** 11,155*** 11,987*** 10,379*** 10,752*** 10,866***
0,211 0,227 0,245 0,225 0,225 0,239 0,234 0,226 0,231 0,237
Industry risk -0,327* -0,354* -0,290 -0,198 -0,187 -0,190 -0,209 -0,439** -0,191 -0,169
0,165 0,171 0,173 0,160 0,159 0,170 0,168 0,159 0,165 0,129
N 29 906 29 414 29 437 34 568 35 067 34 131 35 062 38 688 40 354 38 734
Cox and Snell 0,309 0,328 0,303 0,266 0,316 0,255 0,286 0,252 0,248 0,248
Nagelkerke 0,397 0,420 0,394 0,347 0,413 0,342 0,374 0,346 0,343 0,341
McFadden 0,246 0,262 0,246 0,212 0,263 0,216 0,234 0,223 0,221 0,220
Family has both
Pseudo R-Square
Table 11: Multinomial logistic regression, family firm definition based on supermajority
Multinomial logistic regression where family firms is defined as where family ownership stake is above 66.7%. The independent variables are firm performance 
measured by three years of average return on assets, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board 
members, and industry risk measured by the coefficient of variance. Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0,1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors 
are stated in parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
GRA 1900 Master Thesis  September 1, 2011 
Page 32 of 38 
 
 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -3,222*** -2,962*** -2,583*** -2,485*** -2,781*** -2,037*** -2,758*** -1,491*** -1,344*** -1,208***
0,279 0,277 0,282 0,266 0,264 0,283 0,272 0,277 0,273 0,267
ROA -0,172 -0,092 -0,129 -0,178 0,150 0,104 0,214 0,472** 0,569*** 0,635***
0,161 0,157 0,156 0,147 0,144 0,152 0,147 0,155 0,152 0,166
Firm size 0,133*** 0,111*** 0,109*** 0,089*** 0,101*** 0,065*** 0,122*** 0,045** 0,029* 0,015
0,015 0,015 0,015 0,014 0,014 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,015
Firm age -0,008*** -0,008** -0,013*** -0,011*** -0,010*** -0,013*** -0,011*** -0,009*** -0,007*** -0,008***
0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002
Family ownership stake 1,168*** 1,205*** 1,066*** 1,721*** 1,158*** 1,801*** 1,255*** 2,134*** 2,160*** 2,036***
0,104 0,106 0,110 0,108 0,100 0,114 0,105 0,114 0,113 0,115
Fraction of family board members 2,889*** 3,139*** 3,246*** 2,419*** 3,385*** 2,262*** 2,913*** 1,733*** 1,688*** 1,851***
0,105 0,108 0,113 0,108 0,104 0,111 0,106 0,111 0,110 0,114
Industry risk -0,166* -0,123 -0,252** -0,168* -0,105 -0,167* -0,295*** -0,279*** -0,249*** -0,188**
0,078 0,079 0,080 0,076 0,075 0,078 0,076 0,076 0,074 0,060
Intercept -4,112*** -4,483*** -3,901*** -3,521*** -3,781*** -3,157*** -3,172*** -2,532*** -2,573*** -2,325***
0,294 0,303 0,302 0,279 0,288 0,299 0,282 0,294 0,291 0,285
ROA 0,150 0,482** 0,124 -0,043 0,255 -0,155 0,288 0,606*** 0,616*** 0,569***
0,169 0,172 0,169 0,156 0,159 0,161 0,156 0,168 0,164 0,178
Firm size 0,031* 0,034* 0,021 -0,012 0,005 -0,028 -0,017 -0,050*** -0,042** -0,045**
0,016 0,016 0,016 0,015 0,015 0,016 0,015 0,016 0,015 0,016
Firm age -0,013*** -0,014*** -0,016*** -0,010*** -0,012*** -0,012*** -0,010*** -0,006** -0,007** -0,008***
0,002 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002
Family ownership stake 0,657*** 0,657*** 0,590*** 0,991*** 0,257* 1,082*** 0,525*** 0,751*** 0,696*** 0,649***
0,116 0,122 0,124 0,119 0,116 0,125 0,116 0,126 0,125 0,128
Fraction of family board members 7,633*** 8,254*** 8,231*** 7,653*** 8,410*** 7,448*** 8,043*** 7,188*** 7,253*** 7,349***
0,123 0,131 0,135 0,125 0,126 0,129 0,125 0,128 0,128 0,133
Industry risk 0,176* 0,233** 0,102 0,170* 0,256** 0,154 0,057 0,128 0,075 -0,014
0,082 0,086 0,085 0,079 0,081 0,082 0,079 0,080 0,079 0,064
Intercept -4,865*** -5,206*** -4,780*** -4,738*** -4,709*** -4,542*** -5,274*** -4,265*** -4,529*** -4,372***
0,285 0,295 0,295 0,275 0,281 0,294 0,280 0,290 0,287 0,281
ROA 0,524*** 0,795*** 0,470** 0,474** 0,731*** 0,446** 0,780*** 0,833*** 0,959*** 1,018***
0,164 0,168 0,166 0,154 0,156 0,159 0,154 0,165 0,161 0,175
Firm size 0,001 0,000 -0,016 -0,027 -0,040** -0,043** 0,015 -0,059*** -0,042** -0,044**
0,015 0,015 0,016 0,015 0,015 0,016 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,016
Firm age 0,000 -0,003 -0,005* -0,002 -0,006** -0,007** -0,005* -0,005* -0,004 -0,005*
0,002 0,003 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002
Family ownership stake 2,401*** 2,402*** 2,405*** 2,893*** 2,361*** 3,302*** 2,692*** 3,561*** 3,566*** 3,486***
0,110 0,116 0,118 0,114 0,111 0,120 0,112 0,120 0,120 0,122
Fraction of family board members 9,430*** 10,072*** 10,090*** 9,313*** 10,328*** 9,183*** 9,781*** 8,800*** 8,829*** 8,948***
0,121 0,130 0,133 0,124 0,125 0,128 0,124 0,126 0,125 0,130
Industry risk -0,128 -0,067 -0,134 -0,054 0,013 -0,103 -0,208** -0,115 -0,152 -0,233***
0,080 0,084 0,084 0,078 0,080 0,081 0,079 0,079 0,078 0,064
N 44 534 43 445 43 796 50 646 51 125 48 790 50 427 53 209 54 744 51 956
Cox and Snell 0,445 0,464 0,453 0,429 0,464 0,431 0,447 0,434 0,434 0,431
Nagelkerke 0,511 0,532 0,520 0,493 0,535 0,500 0,514 0,507 0,508 0,505
McFadden 0,288 0,303 0,296 0,275 0,309 0,285 0,291 0,294 0,295 0,294
Family has both
Pseudo R-Square
Table 12: Multinomial logistic regression, family firm definition based on negative majority
Multinomial logistic regression where family firms is defined as where family ownership stake is above 33.3%. The independent variables are firm performance 
measured by three years of average return on assets, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board 
members, and industry risk measured by the coefficient of variance. Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0,1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard 
errors are stated in parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
GRA 1900 Master Thesis  September 1, 2011 
Page 33 of 38 
 
 
 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,005 0,001 0,018 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,006 0,045 0,010 0,000 0,000
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,002 0,024 0,064 0,052 0,087 0,027 0,000 0,016 0,454
Table 13: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, family firm definition based on supermajority
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes
significantly to explain the differences in the choice of family management.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 14: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, family firm definition based on negative majority
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes
significantly to explain the differences in the choice of family management.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -1,972*** -1,280** -1,073** -0,893* -1,222*** 0,029 -1,071* 0,522 0,271 0,322
0,406 0,405 0,416 0,395 0,384 0,440 0,420 0,447 0,450 0,439
ROE 0,012 0,007 0,012 0,001 0,011 0,018 0,015 0,029 0,018 0,049
0,023 0,023 0,025 0,023 0,022 0,024 0,024 0,027 0,028 0,031
Firm size 0,130*** 0,090*** 0,085*** 0,063** 0,088*** 0,022 0,092*** 0,013 0,018 0,008
0,021 0,021 0,022 0,021 0,020 0,023 0,022 0,023 0,023 0,023
Firm age -0,008* -0,007 -0,011** -0,014*** -0,010*** -0,012*** -0,012*** -0,006 -0,008* -0,008*
0,003 0,003 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,502** -0,378* -0,578** 0,201 -0,417* -0,007 -0,436* 0,385* 0,381* 0,329
0,178 0,183 0,189 0,180 0,172 0,195 0,183 0,193 0,194 0,197
Fraction of family board members 3,775*** 3,988*** 4,152*** 3,127*** 4,309*** 2,990*** 3,794*** 2,325*** 2,404*** 2,631***
0,152 0,159 0,168 0,158 0,155 0,168 0,159 0,167 0,168 0,173
Industry risk -0,129 -0,217* -0,219* -0,190 -0,202* -0,199 -0,268* -0,384*** -0,278* -0,272**
0,107 0,108 0,110 0,106 0,102 0,112 0,108 0,108 0,109 0,093
Intercept -2,133*** -1,817*** -1,531*** -1,006* -1,424*** -0,198 -0,409 0,208 0,346 0,486
0,433 0,441 0,445 0,415 0,419 0,464 0,439 0,471 0,473 0,463
ROE 0,047 0,069** 0,079*** 0,049* 0,061* 0,031 0,046 0,039 0,045 0,098**
0,025 0,026 0,027 0,024 0,024 0,026 0,026 0,029 0,030 0,032
Firm size -0,015 -0,041 -0,055* -0,090*** -0,064** -0,139*** -0,131*** -0,125*** -0,126*** -0,121***
0,022 0,023 0,023 0,022 0,022 0,024 0,022 0,024 0,024 0,024
Firm age -0,013*** -0,013*** -0,017*** -0,015*** -0,012*** -0,012*** -0,011*** -0,006 -0,009** -0,012***
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -1,180*** -1,290*** -1,451*** -0,803*** -1,560*** -0,979*** -1,366*** -1,168*** -1,377*** -1,341***
0,197 0,206 0,210 0,196 0,197 0,214 0,203 0,213 0,213 0,218
Fraction of family board members 9,055*** 9,619*** 9,665*** 8,835*** 9,835*** 8,726*** 9,497*** 8,246*** 8,368*** 8,517***
0,177 0,188 0,196 0,179 0,183 0,192 0,185 0,188 0,189 0,195
Industry risk 0,038 0,038 0,096 0,039 0,094 0,112 0,060 -0,089 -0,048 -0,216*
0,113 0,116 0,116 0,110 0,111 0,116 0,112 0,114 0,115 0,099
Intercept -1,501*** -1,227** -1,131** -1,042** -1,138** -0,214 -1,181** -0,166 -0,542 -0,783
0,413 0,423 0,427 0,402 0,402 0,448 0,426 0,454 0,457 0,448
ROE 0,046 0,060* 0,073** 0,057* 0,075*** 0,066** 0,069** 0,038 0,054 0,102***
0,024 0,025 0,026 0,024 0,023 0,025 0,025 0,028 0,029 0,031
Firm size -0,036 -0,063** -0,077*** -0,090*** -0,089*** -0,137*** -0,078*** -0,125*** -0,111*** -0,097***
0,021 0,022 0,022 0,021 0,021 0,023 0,022 0,023 0,023 0,024
Firm age -0,002 -0,004 -0,008* -0,008** -0,008** -0,010*** -0,010** -0,008** -0,011*** -0,013***
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,731*** -0,854*** -0,829*** -0,107 -0,710*** -0,038 -0,459* 0,423* 0,430* 0,333
0,185 0,195 0,199 0,186 0,185 0,202 0,192 0,200 0,201 0,206
Fraction of family board members 10,656*** 11,266*** 11,303*** 10,369*** 11,571*** 10,236*** 10,950*** 9,716*** 9,838*** 10,036***
0,173 0,184 0,192 0,175 0,179 0,187 0,181 0,182 0,183 0,189
Industry risk -0,310** -0,293** -0,206 -0,237* -0,204 -0,216 -0,255* -0,399 -0,336** -0,336***
0,109 0,112 0,113 0,107 0,107 0,113 0,109 0,110 0,111 0,096
N 36 742 36 009 36 168 42 001 42 345 40 221 41 339 44 054 45 435 43 346
Cox and Snell 0,341 0,355 0,335 0,307 0,351 0,292 0,319 0,292 0,289 0,289
Nagelkerke 0,422 0,439 0,417 0,382 0,439 0,373 0,400 0,379 0,377 0,376
McFadden 0,253 0,265 0,251 0,225 0,269 0,226 0,240 0,235 0,233 0,233
 
Pseudo R-Square
Table 15: Multinomial logistic regression, robustness testing, return on equity as proxy for performance
Multinomial logistic regression with family management as the dependent variable. The independent variables are firm performance measured by three years of 
average return on equity firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, and industry risk 
measured by the coefficient of variation.  Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0*1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are stated in 
parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -1,766*** -0,766 -0,971* -0,745 -1,735*** 0,124 -1,291** 1,607*** 1,339** 0,792
0,409 0,424 0,436 0,414 0,404 0,450 0,432 0,466 0,470 0,469
ROA 0,428 0,232 0,475 0,028 0,259 -0,104 0,441 1,182*** 1,183*** 1,060***
0,241 0,239 0,244 0,226 0,220 0,249 0,231 0,253 0,251 0,274
Firm size, ln(assets) 0,123*** 0,059* 0,080*** 0,057* 0,125*** 0,019 0,109*** -0,066* -0,060* -0,029
0,023 0,023 0,025 0,023 0,023 0,026 0,024 0,027 0,027 0,027
Firm age -0,009** -0,007 -0,012*** -0,014*** -0,012*** -0,013*** -0,014*** -0,004 -0,006* -0,007*
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,532** -0,397* -0,585** 0,198 -0,400* -0,022 -0,442* 0,365 0,350 0,346
0,177 0,183 0,190 0,180 0,173 0,195 0,183 0,193 0,194 0,197
Fraction of family board members 3,772*** 4,000*** 4,148*** 3,128*** 4,242*** 2,999*** 3,756*** 2,328*** 2,411*** 2,593***
0,152 0,160 0,170 0,158 0,156 0,169 0,159 0,169 0,170 0,174
Industry risk -0,138 -0,215 -0,207 -0,195 -0,185 -0,205 -0,250* -0,361*** -0,256* -0,251**
0,106 0,107 0,110 0,106 0,102 0,112 0,108 0,108 0,109 0,094
Intercept -1,825*** -1,336** -1,599*** -0,773 -2,001*** -0,069 -0,519 0,953 1,056* 0,674
0,442 0,467 0,472 0,438 0,445 0,480 0,459 0,498 0,500 0,500
ROA 1,140*** 1,081*** 0,946*** 0,218 0,677** 0,060 0,771** 1,532*** 1,325*** 1,321***
0,257 0,261 0,261 0,241 0,243 0,262 0,246 0,273 0,270 0,293
Firm size, ln(assets) -0,043 -0,082** -0,056* -0,110*** -0,032 -0,156*** -0,138*** -0,197*** -0,194*** -0,152***
0,025 0,026 0,027 0,025 0,025 0,027 0,026 0,028 0,028 0,029
Firm age -0,012*** -0,012** -0,017*** -0,014*** -0,012*** -0,011** -0,009** -0,002 -0,006 -0,010**
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -1,157*** -1,265*** -1,451*** -0,808*** -1,532*** -0,962*** -1,304*** -1,113*** -1,337*** -1,261***
0,198 0,207 0,210 0,196 0,197 0,213 0,203 0,213 0,214 0,218
Fraction of family board members 9,046*** 9,626*** 9,680*** 8,858*** 9,804*** 8,757*** 9,480*** 8,285*** 8,425*** 8,557***
0,177 0,189 0,197 0,180 0,183 0,192 0,185 0,190 0,191 0,196
Industry risk 0,042 0,052 0,113 0,040 0,122 0,114 0,091 -0,044 -0,007 -0,188
0,113 0,116 0,116 0,110 0,111 0,116 0,113 0,114 0,115 0,100
Intercept -0,330 0,237 -0,011 -0,016 -0,540 0,640 -0,774 2,003*** 1,590*** 1,402**
0,419 0,447 0,452 0,422 0,425 0,461 0,443 0,478 0,481 0,481
ROA 1,442*** 1,436*** 1,339*** 0,838*** 1,278*** 0,782** 1,443*** 2,103*** 2,037*** 2,173***
0,246 0,251 0,252 0,233 0,233 0,253 0,239 0,262 0,260 0,283
Firm size, ln(assets) -0,127*** -0,177*** -0,166*** -0,171*** -0,144*** -0,209*** -0,124*** -0,296*** -0,276*** -0,263***
0,024 0,025 0,026 0,024 0,024 0,026 0,025 0,027 0,027 0,028
Firm age 0,001 0,000 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006* -0,007* -0,008* -0,002 -0,006 -0,007*
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,669*** -0,787*** -0,772*** -0,050 -0,615*** 0,012 -0,361 0,478* 0,451* 0,394
0,185 0,196 0,199 0,187 0,186 0,202 0,192 0,201 0,202 0,206
Fraction of family board members 10,585*** 11,207*** 11,234*** 10,315*** 11,448*** 10,209*** 10,873*** 9,682*** 9,818*** 9,968***
0,173 0,185 0,193 0,176 0,179 0,187 0,181 0,184 0,184 0,190
Industry risk -0,305** -0,276* -0,187 -0,223* -0,173 -0,200 -0,211 -0,361*** -0,296** -0,308***
0,109 0,113 0,113 0,107 0,107 0,113 0,109 0,110 0,111 0,097
N 36 743 36 008 36 166 41 996 42 342 40 220 41 337 44 055 45 431 43 339
Cox and Snell 0,344 0,358 0,337 0,309 0,353 0,293 0,320 0,295 0,292 0,293
Nagelkerke 0,425 0,442 0,420 0,384 0,442 0,375 0,401 0,383 0,380 0,380
McFadden 0,255 0,267 0,254 0,226 0,272 0,228 0,241 0,238 0,236 0,236
Family has both
Pseudo R-Square
Table 16: Multinomial logistic regression, robustness testing, natural logarithm of assets as proxy for firm size
Multinomial logistic regression with family management as the dependent variable. The independent variables are firm performance measured by three years of 
average return on equity firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, and industry risk 
measured by the coefficient of variation.  Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0*1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are stated in 
parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROE 0,153 0,009 0,002 0,004 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,593 0,137 0,004
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,027 0,004 0,001
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 17: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, robustness testing ROE as proxy for performance
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm size, ln (assets) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,654 0,248 0,031
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001
Table 18: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, robustness testing, ln(asssets) as proxy for performance
This table displays the significance level for the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model as well as the
different independent variables. A significance level less than 0.05 indicates that the independent variable contributes 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,426 0,219 0,042
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,002
Number of owners 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Board size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Dividend level 0,324 0,347 0,178 0,115 0,342 0,130 0,097 0,481 0,068 0,043
Not large city 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 19: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, robustness testing extra variables
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes
significantly to explain the differences in the choice of family management.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -1,419*** -0,984* -0,768 -0,685 -1,448*** 0,017 -1,271** 1,464** 1,197* 0,201
0,435 0,458 0,472 0,441 0,432 0,490 0,470 0,501 0,504 0,506
ROA 0,951*** 0,547* 0,831*** 0,271 0,450 0,128 0,581* 1,311*** 1,331*** 1,188***
0,261 0,255 0,260 0,241 0,232 0,256 0,244 0,267 0,265 0,285
Firm size -0,001 -0,025 -0,013 -0,029 0,051* -0,053 0,037 -0,115*** -0,116*** -0,082**
0,025 0,026 0,027 0,025 0,025 0,028 0,026 0,028 0,028 0,029
Firm age -0,010** -0,008* -0,013*** -0,016*** -0,013*** -0,013*** -0,015*** -0,005 -0,007* -0,008*
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,106 0,225 -0,245 0,599** -0,228 0,428 -0,114 0,688** 0,756*** 1,061***
0,212 0,221 0,232 0,218 0,210 0,242 0,228 0,235 0,236 0,242
Fraction of family board members 3,537*** 3,754*** 3,942*** 2,959*** 4,128*** 2,851*** 3,651*** 2,273*** 2,329*** 2,482***
0,153 0,162 0,171 0,159 0,157 0,170 0,160 0,171 0,170 0,175
Industry risk -0,168 -0,209 -0,230* -0,208 -0,191 -0,220 -0,270* -0,366*** -0,279* -0,264**
0,108 0,109 0,111 0,107 0,103 0,113 0,109 0,109 0,110 0,095
Number of owners -0,008 0,080* -0,002 0,021 -0,009 0,041 0,014 0,041 0,045 0,129***
0,027 0,032 0,033 0,031 0,030 0,037 0,034 0,035 0,035 0,037
Board size 0,415*** 0,276*** 0,339*** 0,281*** 0,233*** 0,246*** 0,263*** 0,157*** 0,189*** 0,165***
0,034 0,034 0,036 0,033 0,031 0,035 0,033 0,034 0,034 0,034
Dividend level -0,059 -0,003 -0,003 0,099 0,033 0,074 0,155 0,105 0,100 0,085
0,095 0,068 0,054 0,058 0,046 0,171 0,104 0,105 0,115 0,111
Not large city 0,130 0,072 0,014 0,120 0,045 0,121 0,074 0,112 0,096 0,152*
0,070 0,071 0,074 0,069 0,068 0,076 0,072 0,075 0,075 0,077
Intercept -1,113* -0,796 -0,776 -0,092 -1,191* 0,646 0,344 1,560** 1,738*** 0,940
0,460 0,493 0,499 0,459 0,469 0,513 0,490 0,529 0,530 0,531
ROA 1,241*** 1,064*** 0,972*** 0,049 0,608* -0,026 0,530* 1,269*** 1,016*** 0,999***
0,271 0,273 0,272 0,252 0,251 0,267 0,256 0,285 0,281 0,301
Firm size -0,057* -0,070* -0,042 -0,098*** 0,001 -0,136*** -0,122*** -0,152*** -0,154*** -0,101***
0,027 0,028 0,029 0,027 0,027 0,029 0,027 0,030 0,030 0,031
Firm age -0,011*** -0,012** -0,017*** -0,014*** -0,011*** -0,011** -0,009** -0,002 -0,006 -0,009**
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -1,153*** -1,244*** -1,620*** -0,915*** -1,819*** -1,083*** -1,476*** -1,227*** -1,462*** -1,172***
0,229 0,242 0,248 0,230 0,232 0,258 0,245 0,252 0,253 0,260
Fraction of family board members 8,386*** 8,967*** 8,991*** 8,235*** 9,251*** 8,180*** 8,870*** 7,709*** 7,795*** 7,876***
0,175 0,189 0,195 0,179 0,184 0,192 0,184 0,192 0,191 0,197
Industry risk 0,024 0,061 0,109 0,050 0,111 0,109 0,090 -0,048 -0,009 -0,180
0,113 0,116 0,117 0,111 0,111 0,117 0,113 0,114 0,115 0,101
Number of owners -0,076* -0,050 -0,114** -0,085* -0,117*** -0,070 -0,083* -0,049 -0,057 0,008
0,031 0,036 0,037 0,034 0,034 0,040 0,038 0,039 0,038 0,041
Board size 0,022 -0,095* -0,070 -0,099** -0,138*** -0,131*** -0,149*** -0,235*** -0,220*** -0,256***
0,039 0,040 0,041 0,038 0,037 0,040 0,039 0,039 0,039 0,040
Dividend level -0,002 0,002 -0,029 0,136* -0,012 0,042 0,236* 0,138 0,222 0,231*
0,099 0,071 0,056 0,059 0,049 0,182 0,109 0,110 0,118 0,112
Not large city -0,206** -0,209** -0,265*** -0,155* -0,288*** -0,257*** -0,242*** -0,282*** -0,273*** -0,196*
0,073 0,076 0,078 0,072 0,073 0,079 0,075 0,079 0,079 0,080
Intercept 0,097 0,444 0,534 0,410 0,037 0,976* -0,266 2,206*** 1,915*** 1,233*
0,437 0,472 0,478 0,443 0,448 0,495 0,473 0,508 0,510 0,512
ROA 1,551*** 1,427*** 1,363*** 0,716** 1,216*** 0,774** 1,287*** 1,945*** 1,835*** 1,967***
0,260 0,263 0,263 0,244 0,241 0,259 0,249 0,275 0,272 0,291
Firm size -0,156*** -0,184*** -0,174*** -0,176*** -0,128*** -0,201*** -0,116*** -0,265*** -0,249*** -0,225***
0,026 0,027 0,027 0,026 0,026 0,028 0,026 0,029 0,029 0,030
Firm age 0,001 0,000 -0,004 -0,005 -0,005 -0,007* -0,008* -0,002 -0,005 -0,007*
0,003 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003
Family ownership stake -0,436* -0,556* -0,733** 0,038 -0,706*** 0,106 -0,332 0,629** 0,562* 0,781**
0,216 0,231 0,237 0,221 0,221 0,246 0,234 0,240 0,242 0,248
Fraction of family board members 9,949*** 10,632*** 10,600*** 9,744*** 10,920*** 9,706*** 10,320*** 9,138*** 9,227*** 9,325***
0,169 0,184 0,190 0,174 0,179 0,186 0,179 0,184 0,184 0,189
Industry risk -0,317** -0,259* -0,184 -0,210* -0,174 -0,204 -0,210 -0,354*** -0,293** -0,292**
0,109 0,113 0,113 0,108 0,107 0,113 0,110 0,110 0,112 0,098
Number of owners 0,001 0,030 -0,030 -0,012 -0,047 0,002 -0,016 0,043 0,022 0,102**
0,028 0,034 0,035 0,032 0,032 0,038 0,036 0,037 0,037 0,039
Board size 0,041 -0,049 -0,037 -0,070 -0,117*** -0,088* -0,116*** -0,210*** -0,193*** -0,230***
0,036 0,038 0,039 0,036 0,035 0,038 0,036 0,037 0,037 0,038
Dividend level 0,051 0,045 0,019 0,135* 0,021 -0,119 0,165 0,095 0,142 0,162
0,095 0,069 0,054 0,057 0,047 0,177 0,107 0,107 0,116 0,110
Not large city -0,085 -0,071 -0,104 -0,029 -0,163* -0,121 -0,133 -0,091 -0,098 -0,019
0,070 0,074 0,075 0,070 0,070 0,076 0,073 0,076 0,076 0,078
N 36 630 35 918 36 079 41 899 42 244 40 119 41 242 43 944 45 333 43 251
Cox and Snell 0,351 0,364 0,344 0,315 0,359 0,299 0,326 0,302 0,298 0,300
Nagelkerke 0,434 0,449 0,428 0,391 0,449 0,383 0,409 0,391 0,388 0,390
McFadden 0,261 0,272 0,260 0,232 0,277 0,233 0,247 0,244 0,242 0,243
Pseudo R-Square
Table 20: Multinomial logistic regression, robustness testing with control variables
Multinomial logistic regression with family management as the dependent variable. The independent variables are firm performance measured by three years of 
average return on assets, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, industry risk 
measured by the coefficient of variance, board size, number of owners dividend level defined as dividend over operating income, and not large city. Significance 
level of 5%, 1% and 0,1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are stated in parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The 
reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family has CEO
Family has Chair
Family has both
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intercept -2,169*** -1,731*** -1,368** -1,091* -0,974* 0,062 -1,366* 0,370 0,147 0,407
0,509 0,511 0,518 0,495 0,474 0,571 0,536 0,597 0,596 0,593
ROA 0,367 0,263 0,434 -0,039 0,273 0,348 0,620* 0,862** 0,873** 0,659
0,293 0,293 0,298 0,278 0,269 0,316 0,291 0,334 0,331 0,367
Firm size 0,137*** 0,099*** 0,089*** 0,062* 0,083*** 0,012 0,087** -0,004 0,015 -0,009
0,027 0,027 0,028 0,027 0,026 0,031 0,028 0,032 0,031 0,033
Firm age -0,012*** -0,010* -0,014*** -0,016*** -0,012*** -0,015*** -0,017*** -0,012** -0,011** -0,012**
0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake 0,118 0,316 0,034 0,971*** -0,444 0,576 0,200 1,312*** 1,404*** 1,490***
0,260 0,262 0,280 0,280 0,248 0,320 0,284 0,321 0,326 0,339
Fraction of family board members 3,168*** 3,240*** 3,328*** 2,196*** 3,688*** 2,008*** 3,033*** 1,390*** 1,298*** 1,493***
0,193 0,195 0,208 0,197 0,189 0,220 0,201 0,227 0,231 0,241
Industry risk -0,175 -0,145 -0,159 -0,148 -0,185 -0,142 -0,133 -0,263 -0,323* -0,327**
0,131 0,135 0,135 0,133 0,127 0,142 0,138 0,145 0,143 0,120
Intercept -1,964*** -1,440** -1,154* -0,863 -1,142* 0,184 -0,567 0,318 0,169 0,497
0,539 0,551 0,549 0,514 0,515 0,592 0,557 0,623 0,619 0,620
ROA 1,357*** 1,440*** 1,266*** 0,165 0,823** 0,477 1,026*** 1,452*** 1,129*** 0,998**
0,314 0,318 0,317 0,292 0,295 0,328 0,309 0,357 0,351 0,388
Firm size 0,005 -0,045 -0,051 -0,061* -0,034 -0,127*** -0,107*** -0,107*** -0,078* -0,086*
0,029 0,029 0,030 0,028 0,028 0,032 0,029 0,033 0,033 0,034
Firm age -0,012** -0,013** -0,017*** -0,015*** -0,014*** -0,012** -0,011** -0,008 -0,009* -0,013***
0,004 0,005 0,005 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake -1,638*** -1,633*** -1,883*** -1,068*** -2,409*** -1,213*** -1,661*** -1,220*** -1,490*** -1,137***
0,282 0,292 0,303 0,292 0,278 0,331 0,304 0,338 0,342 0,356
Fraction of family board members 8,340*** 8,744*** 8,702*** 7,755*** 9,002*** 7,467*** 8,508*** 7,006*** 7,054*** 7,014***
0,223 0,232 0,240 0,220 0,224 0,243 0,233 0,249 0,253 0,264
Industry risk 0,009 0,091 0,148 0,021 0,117 0,117 0,214 -0,058 -0,103 -0,305*
0,138 0,144 0,143 0,137 0,136 0,147 0,143 0,151 0,150 0,128
Intercept -1,426** -0,841 -0,826 -0,823 -0,562 0,016 -1,274* 0,122 -0,626 -0,575
0,509 0,522 0,523 0,493 0,487 0,567 0,537 0,595 0,594 0,595
ROA 1,494*** 1,563*** 1,517*** 0,848** 1,263*** 1,099*** 1,607*** 1,582*** 1,448*** 1,244***
0,298 0,303 0,302 0,280 0,280 0,314 0,297 0,340 0,336 0,371
Firm size -0,023 -0,083** -0,087** -0,092*** -0,095*** -0,137*** -0,071* -0,136*** -0,086** -0,092**
0,027 0,028 0,028 0,026 0,026 0,031 0,028 0,032 0,031 0,033
Firm age -0,004 -0,004 -0,009* -0,009* -0,010** -0,007 -0,008* -0,009* -0,010** -0,012**
0,004 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
Family ownership stake -0,854*** -0,834** -0,838** 0,057 -1,131*** 0,100 -0,394 0,631 0,600 0,801*
0,266 0,277 0,288 0,280 0,262 0,317 0,290 0,323 0,327 0,340
Fraction of family board members 9,983*** 10,343*** 10,304*** 9,249*** 10,681*** 8,940*** 9,895*** 8,497*** 8,552** 8,573***
0,216 0,225 0,234 0,214 0,217 0,235 0,226 0,241 0,244 0,255
Industry risk -0,324* -0,211 -0,129 -0,181 -0,180 -0,170 -0,126 -0,324* -0,357* -0,376**
0,131 0,138 0,137 0,132 0,130 0,141 0,138 0,145 0,144 0,122
N 20 132 19 592 19 738 22 745 22 606 19 933 20 397 19 515 19 305 17 953
Cox and Snell 0,340 0,355 0,335 0,314 0,359 0,302 0,329 0,318 0,323 0,319
Nagelkerke 0,413 0,430 0,409 0,381 0,436 0,373 0,400 0,391 0,396 0,391
McFadden 0,240 0,252 0,238 0,217 0,258 0,217 0,230 0,228 0,231 0,227
Family has both
Pseudo R-Square
Table 21: Multinomial logistic regression, robustness testing with data only including firms with more than one owner
Multinomial logistic regression with family management as the dependent variable. The independent variables are firm performance measured by three years of 
average return on assets, firm size measured by the natural logarithm of sales, firm age, family ownership stake, fraction of family board members, and industry 
risk measured by the coefficient of variation.  Significance levels of 5%, 1% and 0*1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are stated in 
parentheses. Pseudo R-squares are reported at the bottom. The reference category is family has neither CEO nor chair.
Family only has 
CEO
Family only has 
Chair
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall model 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
ROA 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,004
Firm size 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Firm age 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,026 0,044 0,015
Family ownership stake 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Fraction of family board members 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Industry risk 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,013 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,018
Table 22: Significance level for likelihood ratio test, robustness testing with more than one owner
The table displays the significance level of the likelihood ratio test for respectively the whole model and each
independent variablee. A significance level less than 5% indicates that the independent variable contributes
significantly to explain the differences in the choice of family management.
 Kathrine Lærke Søndergaard
Line Floan Almli
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Executive Summary 
In our master thesis we want to examine what characterizes the decision of having 
a member of the family being the CEO or the chairman of the board of the 
company. We define this as family management, which will be the dependent 
variable in our research. Using data from the Center for Corporate Governance 
Research (CCGR), we intend to provide descriptive statistics of correlations 
between family management and various independent variables. This includes 
variables such as performance, size, firm age, family ownership stake and 
industry. To explain the variation in family management, we will use a 
multinomial logit model. Accordingly, the dependent variable will have four non-
ordered, mutually exclusive values; inside CEO, inside chairman of the board, 
inside CEO and inside chairman of the board, and neither inside CEO nor inside 
chairman of the board.  
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1. Introduction 
Family firms are an underexplored area of study, which is in contrast to how 
common they are in the economy (Berzins, Bøhren and Rydland 2008). If studied, 
research is mostly either based on public family firms or weak definitions of 
family firms (e.g. Villalonga and Amit 2006). A lot of the research concerns the 
relationship between family ownership and performance, which is mostly found to 
be positive. However, there have not yet been many papers concerning multiple 
characteristics of family management in the same study. Also, using family 
management as the dependent variable is not a commonly observed methodology. 
We define family management as a situation where a family member either is the 
CEO or chairman of the board, or where a family member holds both positions.  
Through this study we wish to investigate what characterizes a family firm with 
family management. 
 
2. Theory and empirics 
2.1 Existing research 
In the area of corporate governance and family firms, agency theory is relevant. 
The first agency problem deals with conflicts between owners and managers 
(Villalonga and Amit 2006) and is assumed to be less prevalent in family firms as 
the separation between owners and managers is weak. This suggests that the 
performance of family firms should be enhanced (Bhaumik and Gregoriou 2009). 
The second agency problem deals with conflicts between large and small 
shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2006), where the large shareholder in this case 
is the family. The family might have their own agenda at the expense of the 
smaller shareholders. The significance of this agency problem is ambiguous. On 
the one hand it is very small seeing that the family itself carries most of the costs 
(Bøhren 2009). On the other hand, the expropriation of the non-family owners by 
the family might have a serious effect on the firm’s performance (Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou 2009), which indicates that the second agency problem certainly is 
present. 
Previous studies support both perspectives, although there is more support to a 
positive relationship between family firms and performance. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) explore the relation between performance, measured by return on assets 
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(ROA) and Tobin’s q, and founding-family ownership of S&P500 firms. They 
firstly find that family firms outperform non-family firms, and secondly that when 
a family member is the CEO, performance is better than with an outside CEO. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) studied how family ownership, -control and-
management affect firm value, measured by ROA and Tobin’s q. Using data on all 
Fortune-500 firms, they found that there is only a positive relationship when the 
founder is the CEO of the family firm or if the founder is the chairman of the 
board and the CEO is hired. This study only examines listed firms and uses a 
proxy to determine family ownership. The results of this research are supported by 
Cucculelli and Micucci (2008), who found that family successions in Italian firms 
have a negative impact on firm performance, measured by ROA and return on 
sales (ROS). 
Jenssen, Mishra and Randøy (2001) found a positive relationship between firm 
value, measured by Tobin’s q and founding family control, and that this 
relationship is stronger for older firms. Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schøne (2005) 
show that family firms with an outside CEO have the same productivity as non-
family firms, whereas family firms with a inside CEO are less productive.  
Hillier and McColgan (2009) investigate UK listed companies and find that the 
performance of family firms, measured by ROA, improves after the 
announcement of the departure of a family CEO. They ascribe the effect to the 
fact that family CEOs does not leave their position after weak firm performance. 
Moreover, they find that family managed firms have a lower level of board 
independence.  
Bennedsen et al. (2006) investigate Danish family firms and the relationship 
between family succession decisions and performance, measured by operating 
return on assets (OROA). They find an immense negative impact on firm 
performance. However, what is more interesting in relation to this paper is that 
they found that a family-CEO underperforms in large and more complex firms.  
2.2 Possible implications 
Previous studies on family firms and their characteristics have foremost either 
focused on family succession or mainly been based on public family firms. Seeing 
that this paper will concentrate on characteristics of family firms, in relation to 
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inside CEO and inside chairman of the board, our thesis will likely contribute to a 
more comprehensive and integrated perspective on family firms, as this is an 
approach yet to be observed.  
 
3. Research question  
3.1 Main research question 
What characterizes family firms with family management? 
We want to examine what characterizes the decision of having a member of the 
family being the CEO or the chairman of the board of the company. This includes 
both what determines the choices separately, but also if there is a relationship 
between the two choices.  
3.2 Sub questions 
Based on our research question and our understanding of it, we propose the 
following sub questions 
 What characterizes a firm with an inside CEO? 
 What characterizes a firm with an inside chairman of the board? 
 What is the relationship between these characteristics? 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Database 
We will use data from Norwegian private and public firms over the period of 2000 
– 2009. We will retrieve the data from the Center for Corporate Governance 
Research (CCGR).  
4.2 Data filters 
To ensure consistency in the research of family firms we will apply the same data 
filter as Berzins, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2008) which includes:  
 Filter 1: Remove all companies without limited liability 
 Filter 2: Positive sales 
 Filter 3: Positive assets 
 Filter 4: Companies must have employees in the sample period  
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 Filter 5: Current assets must exceed cash equivalents 
 
 Filter 6: Assets must exceed working capital  
 Filter 7: Non-negativity restrictions on various accounting statements 
 
Filter 1-4 ensures that the firms in the sample have limited liability and are active 
(Svalland and Vangstein 2009). Filter 5-6 put consistency restrictions on the 
relationship between a sum and its components, while filter 7 deletes firms that do 
not pass non-negativity restriction on several balance sheet items (Berzins, Bøhren 
and Ødegaard 2008). We will also use consolidated numbers, and therefore 
exclude the subsidiaries when there is a parent company. 
4.3 Variables 
Family firm 
We define family firms as firms where blood-and-marriage family owns more 
than 50% of the firm’s equity. This means that the cut-off point of family firms is 
determined whether or not the family has a simple majority in the firm. This is 
measured by converting item no. 15302 in the CCGR database into a dummy 
variable. 
Family management 
Family management is when a family member, by blood or marriage, is the CEO 
or chairman of the board of the family firm. This family member is called inside 
CEO and inside chairman of the board.  This corresponds respectively to item no. 
15304 and 15305 in the database.  
Performance 
We measure performance by return on assets (ROA), using item no. 127 in the 
CCGR database. According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2009) ROA measures 
the profitability for all contributors of capital. It is defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) plus financial income divided by total assets 
[(EBIT+financial income)/Total assets]. ROA measures how well the 
management of the firm uses the firm’s assets to create profit through the 
operations of the firm (Robinson et al 2009). As mentioned before, existing 
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research supports both a negative and a positive relationship between performance 
and family firms, although there is more support to a positive relationship. 
Size  
To control for the size of the firm, we measure firm size by the natural logarithm 
of sales, using item no. 9 in the CCGR database. We have chosen this measure to 
make size independent of the firm’s technology and capital structure. The size 
might affect the stability of the firm, which again could affect the choice of CEO. 
It would therefore be interesting to see whether family management in family 
firms is characterized of whether the firm is small or not. Being a majority owner 
of a large firm requires large wealth, and the large owner will in most cases stay 
undiversified. Because of this, there is lower ownership concentration in large 
firms. From this we assume that families have the same problem of maintaining a 
high ownership stake in a large firm, and believe that most family firms are small. 
This is also indicated in existing literature and research. According to Anderson 
and Reeb’s (2003) study of S&P500 family firms, these are smaller than other 
firms. Bennedsen et al. (2006) find that family firms with a family successor are 
smaller than firms that select a non-family CEO. Smith and Adu (1999) find the 
interesting results of family succession being seen as more challenging and value 
reducing for smaller firms because the CEO of smaller firms have more control 
than in larger firms. Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) support the argument of Smith 
and Adu (1999) in that they have found that replacing the founder of a small or 
medium-size company is more challenging because of the founder’s closer 
personal ties with the stakeholders of the firm.  
Firm age 
We want to measure firm age using item no. 13420 in the CCGR database. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) analyze the age of the firm, and find that family firms 
are younger than non-family firms. Cuccilelli and Micucci (2008) use the natural 
logarithm of the firms’ age when examining family succession and firm's 
performance measured by ROA. Bennedsen et al (2006) finds that performance is 
not affected by firm age around successions. It would be interesting to see 
whether family management is related to the firms’ age, and if family firms are 
younger or older compared to other firms. 
Family ownership stake in the firm 
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According to Bøhren (2009) there are a lot of family firms with super-majority or 
even no other owners than the family. As there is variation in the stake of the firm 
not held by family, it is likely that the non-family stake will affect whether or not 
family management in family firms is prevalent. From agency theory we know 
that in a firm where majority owner has an ownership stake just above 50%, the 
conflicts between large and small owners are more serious compared to a firm 
where the majority owner has close to a 100% ownership stake. The reason is that 
majority owner’s incentives to extract private benefits from the firm are larger 
when he owns just above 50% than when the ownership stake is closer to 100%. 
We believe that as ownership stake for the family decreases it will be more 
challenging to implement family management than if the family ownership is 
higher. This is because the minority shareholders want to prevent the majority 
owner (the family) to get extended control over the firm. According to Smith and 
Abu (1999) this challenge can be enlarged when the firm is small, because then 
the CEO has more control in the firm than in larger firms. We can also speculate 
on whether there are more incentives for the family to have a family CEO when 
family ownership decreases in order to remain control of the firm. This is 
consistent with majority owner’s incentives to extract private benefits. We 
measure family ownership stake by item no. 15302 in the CCGR database.  
Industry 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the distribution of family firms across 
industries is not uniformly distributed. Therefore it should be controlled for in a 
regression analysis. The question is whether there is reason to believe that 
industry will have an effect on performance that is independent of the effect on 
family management, and also if it is relevant to include this is an analysis. 
Controlling for industry is accomplished by using item no. 11102 and/or no. 
11103 in the CCGR database.  
Location of the firm 
This variable might affect performance in terms of whether the firm is located in 
the central or in the more rural parts of Norway, and may be an important control 
variable. We will measure this by reviewing if the firm is located in a city or not 
using item no. 505. A problem with this measure is that a lot of relatively small 
places are called cities in Norway, so it would be helpful to look at both full 
county and district number, using item no. 503 and no. 504 in the CCGR database. 
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We need to review if this is relevant and not extensively time consuming for our 
analysis. 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Dependent variable 
As we plan to examine how different characteristics affects the choice of family 
management, we will let family management be the dependent variable. We 
propose to let the dependent variable have four non-ordered, mutually exclusive 
values: 
Y1: Inside CEO 
Y2: Inside chairman of the board 
Y3: Inside CEO and inside chairman of the board 
Y4: Neither inside CEO nor inside chairman of the board 
When the dependent variables have multiple outcomes that cannot be ordered, we 
apply the methodology of multinomial logit. According to Boorooah (2002) this is 
a valid method when we examine choices that have no apparent negative or 
positive connotation.  
5.2 Independent variables 
We will use the variables described in chapter 4.3 as independent variables to see 
how these variables affects the choice of family management.  
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
In the first step of the analysis of family management, we intend to provide 
descriptive statistics of correlations between family management and the 
independent variables. The table should provide correlations and the significance 
level for family firms as a whole as well as the four mutually exclusive categories 
mentioned above. 
5.4 Regression model 
In a multinomial logit specification, the dependent variable represents discrete 
choices, which corresponds to the four non-ordered values above. We are 
modeling choices and so we are attempting to explain variation in those choices 
with our set of independent variables also described above. 
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We propose the following multinomial logit model: 
Yi =  ∑(βi* independent variable i) 
=  β1* performance + β2*size + β3*firm age +  
  β4*family owner-stake + βn*variable n 
To see how performance affects family management we intend to make use of two 
separate models. One model that uses performance at time t and one model which 
uses lagged performance at time t-1.  
 
As we have several companies with observed variables over time, the data is 
considered as panel or longitudinal data. Seeing that a multinomial logit model is 
not compatible with panel data, we intend to run year-by-year regressions to deal 
with this issue. 
5.5 Endogeneity problem 
The study has a potential endogeneity problem (Berzins et al 2008). There is a 
possibility not only that the choice of inside/outside CEO affects the firm 
performance, but that performance also affects the decision whether to have an 
inside or outside CEO. One possible reason for this is that when a firm has a low 
level of performance, they might not afford an outside CEO. Also, low 
performance might force the firm to get a new CEO. Furthermore, this 
endogeneity problem might also apply to other variables such as the relationship 
between firm size and family management. 
 
Several measures can be utilized to take this into account. Firstly, letting 
performance be an independent variable in a logit regression, as we intend to do, 
is an alternative. Secondly, measuring performance at two different points in time 
as elaborated above is another alternative. A third and not yet discussed 
alternative is to divide the firms into different categories according to 
performance. One possibility is to categorize firm performance as high, medium 
or low, and then run regressions within those three categories. This will likely 
reduce the endogeniety problem. 
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6. Robustness testing 
6.1 Alternative econometric techniques 
In a multinomial logit model the error terms is assumed to be independent. This 
becomes problematic when the dependent variables or choices are similar to one 
another (Brooks 2008). This is known as the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). To overcome this problem one can instead use a multinomial 
probit model. Here, the error terms are allowed to correlate. However, this method 
requires a calculation of multiple integrals making it an intensive computational 
exercise (Kennedy 2003).  
 
Finding other alternatives to the multinomial logit model is difficult seeing that 
only a few models allow for non-ordered dependent variables. To test the 
robustness of the model, it will be important to utilize numerous goodness-of-fit 
measures. 
6.2 Alternative empirical proxies 
To test the robustness of our model it is necessary to explore alternative measures 
for some of the variables we are using. We define family firms based on simple 
majority in our base case; that is a situation where blood-and-marriage family 
owns more than 50% of the firm’s equity. Alternative definitions of family firms 
are based on negative majority and super-majority. This is family ownership stake 
above respectively 1/3 and 2/3 of the firm’s equity (Bøhren, 2010). 
 
Performance can also be measured in different ways, where we in our model 
intend to use return on assets (ROA). Alternative measures of performance are 
return on operating assets (ROOA), return on net operating assets (RNOA), return 
on capital employed (ROCE), and return on equity (ROE). In the robustness test 
we will use ROE as an alternative proxy for performance (item no. 126), as this 
measure is less likely to correlate with ROA. 
 
There are several alternatives to the natural logarithm of sales when measuring 
firm size, and reviewing existing research we find that the natural logarithm of 
assets was used by both Bennedsen et al (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
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while Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) measured firm size by number of employees. 
It will be useful to include these alternatives in our robustness test. 
6.3 Alternative theoretical variables 
Additional characteristics of family firms with family management that would be 
interesting to examine are board size (item no. 602), number of owners (item 
no.202), leverage (item no. 122), level of dividends (item no. 41), and liquidity 
(item no. 119 and no. 120). We will therefore use these variables in our robustness 
test to see if these items change the initial results of our model. 
 
7. Implementation plan 
February 1
st
   Feedback from advisor 
Ready to start statistical analysis 
March 15
th
   Statistical analysis done and first analysis start 
June 10
th
   First version of thesis ready 
   Comments from advisor 
July 1
st
   Planned finish of thesis 
September 1
st
   Deadline final thesis  
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